

CURRENT *History*

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE
OF WORLD AFFAIRS

FEBRUARY 1964

SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

UNITED STATES POLICY IN SOUTHERN ASIA	<i>William C. Johnstone</i>	65
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR PAKISTAN	<i>Norman D. Palmer</i>	71
CHALLENGE FOR INDIAN LEADERSHIP	<i>M. V. Pylee</i>	78
FROM DEMOCRACY TO DICTATORSHIP IN BURMA	<i>Josef Silverstein</i>	83
THE FORMATION OF MALAYSIA	<i>C. Paul Bradley</i>	89
POWER BALANCE IN INDONESIA	<i>Amry Vandenbosch</i>	95
VIETNAM: LAND WITHOUT LAUGHTER	<i>Thomas E. Ennis</i>	101
THE IMPORTANCE OF LAOS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA	<i>Frank N. Trager</i>	107

REGULAR FEATURES

CURRENT DOCUMENTS • <i>Statement on U.S. Asian Policy</i>	112
BOOK REVIEWS	113
THE MONTH IN REVIEW	<i>Mary Katharine Hammond</i> 119

FOR READING TODAY...FOR REFERENCE TOMORROW

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CURRENT History

FOUNDED IN 1914 BY
The New York Times

PUBLISHED BY
Current History, Inc.

EDITOR, 1943-1955:
D. G. Redmond

FEBRUARY, 1964
VOLUME 46 NUMBER 270

Publisher:
DANIEL G. REDMOND, JR.

Editor:
CAROL L. THOMPSON

Assistant Editor:
JOAN B. ANTELL

Editorial Assistant:
NEYSA S. HEBBARD

Promotion Consultant:
MARY A. MEEHAN

Contributing Editors
ROSS N. BERKES
University of Southern California

SIDNEY B. FAY
Harvard University

MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY
Columbia University

HANS W. GATZKE
The Johns Hopkins University

NORMAN A. GRAEBNER
University of Illinois

OSCAR HANDLIN
Harvard University

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ
University of Notre Dame

HANS KOHN
City College of New York

NORMAN D. PALMER
University of Pennsylvania

CARROLL QUIGLEY
Georgetown University

JOHN P. ROCHE
Brandeis University

A. L. ROWSE
All Souls College, Oxford

HARRY R. RUDIN
Yale University

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN
Williams College

RICHARD VAN ALSTYNE
University of Southern California

COLSTON E. WARNE
Amherst College

ARTHUR P. WHITAKER
University of Pennsylvania

JOHN WUORINEN
Columbia University

Book Review Editor:
ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN
University of Pennsylvania

Coming Next Month

EAST AFRICA

March, 1964

Our March, 1964, issue deals with the nations of eastern Africa. This is a companion piece to our December, 1963, issue on West Africa. Seven articles in this issue will include:

Uganda

by TERRANCE HOPKINS, Professor of Sociology, Columbia University;

The Somali Republic

by SAADIA TOUVAL, Professor of Political Science and African Studies, Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and author of *Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa*;

The Malagasy Republic

by WILLIAM FOLTZ, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Yale University;

Kenya

by COLIN LEGUM, writer for the London *Observer*, and editor of *Africa: A Handbook to the Continent*;

The Republic of South Africa

by MARY BENSON, specialist on South African Affairs, and contributor to the London *Observer*, *The Times*, and *The Guardian*;

Rhodesia and Nyasaland

by F. M. G. WILLSON, chairman of the Department of Government, University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland;

Tanganyika

by LIONEL CLIFFE, Resident Tutor in Political Science, Kuvukoni College, Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika.

Published monthly by Current History, Inc., Publication Office, 1822 Ludlow St., Phila. 3, Pa. Editorial Office, Wolfsit Rd., Norwalk, Conn. Second Class Postage paid at Phila., Pa., and additional mailing office. Indexed in *The Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature*. Individual copies may be secured by writing to the publication office. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright, 1964, by Current History, Inc.

85 cents a copy • \$7.75 a year • Canada \$8.00 a year • Foreign including the Philippines, \$8.50 a year
Please see inside back cover for quantity purchase rates.

NO ADVERTISING

CURRENT History

FEBRUARY, 1964

VOL. 46, NO. 270

In this analytical study of south and southeast Asia, seven nations of this area are evaluated. Our introductory article outlines United States foreign policy in this region, discussing its strengths and its limitations. As this specialist sees it, "Fundamentally the problem for American policy in south and southeast Asia is that the countries of this area across Communist China's southern frontiers constitute a huge area of instability."

United States Policy in Southern Asia

By WILLIAM C. JOHNSTONE

*Professor of Asian Studies, School of International Studies,
Johns Hopkins University*

AMERICAN POLICY in southern Asia must be judged for its effectiveness within the contexts of the cold war, the diversity of the peoples in the region, their own success or lack of it in solving their problems, in terms of the legacy of traditional foreign policy principles and of the nature of American internal politics and the complex machinery of the American government.

It is not enough to set out the environment within which American policy in a region is formulated and operates. One asks the question, how effective has our policy in south and southeast Asia been in respect to our major goals of resisting the spread of Communist influence and of assisting the nations of the area to develop viable, stable governments capable of protecting their independence? The corollary to this question is, have there been substantial Communist gains or losses? A brief review of what has happened in south and southeast Asia may provide a basis for making up a balance sheet.

Once Japan was defeated in 1945, the United States found itself more and more closely involved with an increasing number of

newly independent states. This new involvement was not with homogeneous peoples, but with some 600 million individuals representing a far greater diversity of language, culture, long political history, and religion than on any other continent. In general, Americans had remained woefully ignorant of this *mélange* of peoples, of their long past, their modes of behavior, and their internal rivalries. Only slowly has some of the much needed knowledge about south and southeast Asia become more widely known in the United States, but errors of nomenclature, historical facts and geography can still be found in official statements and unofficial writings. Only now have we begun to realize that United States policy towards southern Asia is more than relations with some twelve independent states. Instead, it has become a deep involvement with peoples in almost every stage of development, with centuries-old traditions and habits still very much alive and not easily dismissed.

In the face of this tremendous diversity and the post-war fragmentation of this whole area into struggling new nations—replete with fierce internal struggles—it has not been possi-

ble, apparently, for the United States to formulate a regional foreign policy, or any such "grand design" as we have participated in for Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere.

From the surrender of Japan to the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950, the United States was engaged in a liquidation process. Occupation of South Korea and of Japan was considered necessary only long enough to enable these two countries to stand on their own feet. It was still hoped that, with some effort on our part, the civil war in China might result in a stable and independent government, though perhaps composed of various groups, including the Communists. Our traditional policy of no intervention without invitation dictated a disengagement from any direct embroilment in the Chinese civil war once Japan was defeated. Our efforts were primarily mediatory. Rightly or wrongly, responsibility for restoration of order and post-war rehabilitation in southeast Asia and in the subcontinent was handed over to the former colonial powers. (The Philippines, of course, was kept an American responsibility.)

Unfortunately, the surrender of Japan caught the Allied powers in a state of unpreparedness in southeast Asia. The French and the Dutch could give small aid to predominantly British forces in taking the surrender of the Japanese. After the war there was a long interval between Japan's surrender and the return of British, French and Dutch authority to their former colonies. And, as a result, most of these colonies were saturated with surplus weapons, easily obtainable by a variety of rebel groups intent on selfish gain or on quick realization of their goal of freedom. Many of these groups were Communist and received encouragement, after 1948, from the post-war Moscow line, that the newly independent governments were not truly free of Western "capitalist-imperialist control." Hence armed insurrection by Communists against the new governments was at least in accord with Moscow's views, even if no con-

crete assistance was forthcoming.

American policy was largely limited to mediation between the independence groups and their former colonial masters, as in Indonesia. It is true that significant direct economic and military assistance was given to the French in Indochina who were attempting to wipe out the Communists under Ho Chi-Minh.¹ But, basically, the United States had demobilized and since only the Soviet Union stood as a great power opponent in the post-war world, attention focused on Europe and on any point at which the Soviets seemed intent on expansion of their power.

The victory of the Chinese Communists in the fall of 1949 did not immediately cause a fundamental re-appraisal of American policy towards Asia. The facts were obscured by the miasma of charge and counter-charge over the "failure" of American policy to keep China from the Communist camp. The war being waged by the French against the Communists in Indochina was little understood and often criticized as a revival of imperialism which the United States should not condone.

The United States was still uncertain as to how it should adjust its policy to the new Chinese Communist regime when armed aggression in Korea in 1950 forced an immediate policy decision. It resulted in American re-armament. It caused the United States to take positive steps towards securing the Asian states, where possible, against future Communist aggression. Henceforth, by treaty arrangements, culminating in the Southeast Treaty Organization (Seato) established in Manila in September, 1954, the United States adopted a forward policy of assisting, when asked, the nations of south and southeast Asia under attack from the Communists or gravely threatened by them.

The period between the beginning of the Korean war and the Geneva accord on Indochina in July, 1954, marked only one significant Communist gain—establishment of the Ho Chi-Minh regime in North Vietnam. Elsewhere, there seemed to be good grounds for believing that the new nations could so re-order their affairs as to achieve some measure of stability. Indonesia gained full in-

¹ American economic and military aid to the French from 1946 to 1953 totaled \$1.2 billion.

dependence in 1949 and set about the job of nation-building despite the large Communist party (the P.K.I.). Insurrections in Burma and Malaya were continuing but, lacking any effective support from the Communist bloc, they were slowly suffering attrition and had lost their power to threaten the government's existence. The two huge nations of the sub-continent, India and Pakistan, still at loggerheads over Kashmir, had nevertheless avoided armed conflict. (In this dispute, the United States again was active in a mediatory role through the United Nations.)

Prior to the completion of the new American supported security arrangements in Manila, the Chinese Communists, apparently more intent on their problems at home than on aggression abroad, had begun a new policy of moderateness towards the countries of south and southeast Asia. Consolidation of their control over Tibet in 1951 resulted in an accord with India in which the Peking regime introduced the "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence"—the alleged guide to their relations with non-Communist governments. There followed numerous exchanges of visits between Peking and these Asian states culminating in the Bandung Conference in the spring of 1955 at which many of the nations became convinced of Peking's "non-aggressiveness." Perhaps unfortunately, the principles agreed to at the Manila Conference and embodied in the Pacific Charter, were subsequent to Peking's announced "Five Principles" and were largely lost sight of in the following years.

Between 1954 and 1959, it appeared that communism had been checked in south and southeast Asia. Malaya became the twelfth independent state in the area and, if elsewhere political stability was still far from a reality, Communist influence, either Chinese or Russian, did not seem to have made significant gains. The one effort of Peking to redress the balance of power in its favor—the Formosa straits battle of 1958—ended in a real defeat. Apparent Soviet refusal to supply Peking with modern nuclear weapons foreshadowed the deterioration in their relationships.

Looking back, this period of some five years seemed to lull the fears of leaders in the countries of southern Asia that the Chinese Communists constituted any real danger to their independence. Americans were constantly being told that the United States was much too pre-occupied with the "Communist danger." American offers of an increasing amount of economic aid to all the nations in this region were often taken for granted as help which the United States—a rich nation—was somehow morally obligated to provide.

The revolt against the Chinese regime in Tibet in April, 1959, dramatically demonstrated the logic of American fears. From the image of a regime supporting principles of "peaceful co-existence," including the principle of "non-interference in the affairs of other states," the Chinese Communists were revealed as having nothing less than the goal of hegemony over the whole of Asia. For, although ruthless Chinese suppression of the Tibetan revolt could be viewed as an internal problem, its aftermath revealed that two years previously the Chinese Communists had begun construction of the Sinkiang-Lhasa highway across the Aksai Chin plateau in Ladakh over territory long claimed as a part of India. This, in turn, triggered the chain of events leading directly to Peking's armed attack on India in 1962.

What are some of the elements which have appeared to effect the change in Peking's posture from moderateness to belligerency? It seems that the rulers in Peking became convinced in 1957-1958 that Soviet superiority in missiles and in general technology had changed the world balance of power in favor of the "Communist camp." Self-isolated from contacts with and knowledge of the world outside the Communist bloc, more even than the Soviets, they evolved the concepts which they have been articulating with increasing belligerency ever since.

The Chinese Communist oligarchs believe that Chinese power must be firmly established as an independent entity. They believe that no nation is truly independent until it has been freed from Western "capitalist-imperialist" influence. Hence, they have announced

full support for "national wars of liberation" and have reacted with increasing violence and invective to any of Khrushchev's attempts at accommodation with the United States and the West. They are also firmly convinced that it is their particular brand of communism which has relevance for the developing countries of the world. The primary requirement for success of their policy and realization of their aims is the elimination of the United States from any influence in the affairs of south and southeast Asia. The crucial test of American policy is how it has been devised to meet this Chinese Communist challenge since 1959.

The period of the Tibetan revolt, when the Chinese were preparing for their later attack on India, also saw a new Chinese initiative in southeast Asia in both Laos and South Vietnam. The degree to which Peking supported the efforts of the Pathet Lao in Laos and the Vietcong guerrillas in South Vietnam cannot be documented at present. That Ho Chi-Minh's primary objective is control of all of Vietnam and as much else as his forces can capture, seems clear enough. That he has received aid from the Soviets, as well as the Chinese Communists, is without question. Here were two countries in danger, yet American policy in each case was formulated and carried out differently. The reasons are revealing.

In the case of Laos, the United States had been providing both economic aid and military assistance to enable the government to become strong enough to manage its own affairs and protect its independence. Because the Geneva accords on Indochina in 1954 had permitted two provinces to remain under the Communist Pathet Lao, we were dealing with a country divided and a government riven with political factionalism. This factionalism broke out in an armed insurrection with at least three main factions struggling for dominance. No leader or group able to unify the country appeared. With civil warfare after 1959, the options available to the United States were limited.

It is hard to see how the United States could have taken any course other than that

it followed in supporting the declaration of neutrality signed at Geneva on July 23, 1962. It is probable that neither the United States Congress nor any important segment of the American people would have supported the use of a considerable force of American troops in Laos to flush out the Pathet Lao guerrillas and fully ensure that no foreign forces remained or could infiltrate the country.

It has been said that Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev told the late President Kennedy at their meeting in Vienna that, if the United States wanted to get bogged down in Laos, he had no objections, but thought it very foolish. Whether true or not, this thought lay behind the United States decision. At that time too, the International Control Commission (set up by the Geneva Accord of 1954) could be expected to function effectively only if it were given ample authority and logistic support and even armed protection. Neither the governments of India or Canada were presumably prepared to support such a posture and the government of Poland, the third member of the Commission, could not be expected to join such an effort. So American military assistance was withdrawn. The Pathet Lao still remain in control of vital areas along the North and South Vietnamese borders and afford a sanctuary for the Communist guerrillas operating against the South Vietnam government.

American policy towards Laos illustrates former Secretary of State Dean Acheson's assertion that the United States can supply only some components in the protection of a country's independence. If determination and the support of the government are lacking, the United States is handicapped from the start.

The case of South Vietnam has been different. Following the Geneva accords, the government of President Ngo Dinh Diem won an overwhelming support from the people. In the years between 1954 and 1959, this government seemed to have made substantial progress. Nearly a million refugees from the Communist north were absorbed and resettled. Contesting sects and gangster groups in Saigon were suppressed. There were ample grounds

in 1959 for optimism that here was a government which met our criteria for assistance in the struggle to prevent Communist expansion.

Then something happened. First the Ho Chi-Minh regime, with Communist bloc encouragement, launched an intensive guerrilla campaign against Diem's government. We responded to a call for help because here was a government which seemed to have the determination to protect its independence and to have the support of its people. Our assistance steadily mounted until over 15,000 American soldiers were committed to this cause. When the determination of the Diem government degenerated into the closed rule of a family oligarchy, apparently out of touch with the desires and aspirations of the people of the country, the United States faced the same dilemma it had in Laos, but we were too heavily committed to do anything but try to hang on. In 1963, a military coup d'état eliminated the family oligarchy but the future of Vietnam is still in doubt and the full extent of the American commitment necessary to preserve its independence remains an unknown quantity.

It is ironic that while attention has been focused on Laos and Vietnam, another country of southeast Asia has slowly come under Communist influence with little, if any, American concern, let alone positive counter-action. On March 2, 1962, a military group seized the government of Burma by an almost bloodless coup d'état, suspended the constitution and the courts and jailed the previous Prime Minister and his cabinet. Subsequently, almost all Western influence has been eliminated from Burma, both private and public. Western newsmen are virtually barred and even Western officials are restricted in their contacts and travel within the country. These developments were almost unnoticed in the American press and took place without any official protests that were made public.

Chinese Communists and Russians move freely in Burma and ties between this Buddhist country and its big neighbor to the north have been strengthened to the point that it is doubtful if the present Burma government has retained its freedom of action in foreign

affairs. Since the government has pursued a policy of "neutralism" which bars it from requesting American or Western assistance to check Chinese Communist infiltration and influence, the United States has had to stand aside. It would be ironic, indeed, if we should succeed in stemming the tide of Communist advance in Vietnam, while Burma quietly and inexorably became a Communist satellite—splitting south and southeast Asia in two parts, with Communist territory in between.

American relations with India provide another illustration of the framework within which American policy in this part of the world has to operate. India was the first state to declare its "non-alignment" or "neutralism" in the cold war conflict, and, until 1962, seemed to be a major obstacle to United States aims and objectives for southern Asia. As a leader of the neutralist bloc in the United Nations, the Indian government was the leading exponent of that strange double standard of the neutralist nations—judging the United States and the West with suspicion and cynicism while attributing the loftiest motives and principles to Moscow and Peking.

Nevertheless, the United States responded to India's requests for economic aid to the extent of over \$2 billion. Yet, when Chinese armies poured across its frontiers in October, 1962, a sudden surge of courage led India to the ousting of Menon and an urgent plea for help from the United States and the British Commonwealth. This plea came at the height of the Cuban crisis, when the United States and the Soviet Union were in direct confrontation. The American and British response to India was immediate and substantial, and probably checked a Chinese Communist advance which might have captured a large slice of Indian territory. As a result, the United States has extended its commitments in resistance to communism to virtually the whole of the large subcontinent.

In the face of possible aggression from a non-Communist source, that of Indonesia against West Irian, the United States took the lead in the mediation, even though it resulted in Indonesia's aims being achieved.

Further, there is little doubt that the United States stands ready to support the new Federation of Malaysia against Indonesian aggression, although we actively share this responsibility with Britain and Australia. These actions are in accord with the American tradition of working towards, where possible, and if requested, the protection of weaker nations when threatened, no matter whether that threat is Communist-inspired or not.

The period since 1959 has been one of recurring crises and troubles in south and southeast Asia for American policy. At the beginning of a new year, almost two decades after Japan's surrender, how do we stand? The foregoing analysis, although brief, underlines one thing: That no matter how skillful our diplomacy, no matter how much assistance we have poured into south and southeast Asia, no matter how firmly we are committed to resist Communist expansion, the United States alone cannot direct the destinies or order the policies of other governments. No United States President would embark independently on a course of domination of the governments in southern Asia, even if such a course had the slightest chance of success. Nor could any United States President give full rein to American acts of subversion, under-cover infiltration and that dishonesty which is endemic to Communist relations.

As we have seen, American foreign policy in southern Asia is fraught with difficulties. Perhaps these difficulties can be diminished in the years ahead, but, in all candor, there seems to have been a slow, continuing erosion of American and Western influence in south and southeast Asia since 1959. The government of Pakistan is acting less like an ally of the United States and the West and more like a willful child in its flirtations with Communist China and its intransigence over Kashmir. The government of India still publicly adheres to non-alignment but is undergoing an internal political re-alignment with still unforeseen results. Burma, Cambodia and Laos are heavily influenced by Peking and may well have gone beyond the point of no return. Indonesia remains an uncertain quantity under the volatile Sukarno.

Certainly it is not unfair, even if it is unpalatable, to acknowledge that the United States and its Western allies have been unable, and, in some cases, unwilling to exert sufficient influence to check the increase in Communist China's efforts at building a position of dominance in Asia. No amount of analysis of Communist China's troubles at home which purports to prove that its power and capabilities are lessening can overcome obvious facts. There are an unknown number of Chinese Communist divisions along the long border from Ladakh to Laos; a military road network of no mean proportions is nearing completion in Tibet and in Yunnan, with prongs pointed to the bordering countries. Only three countries besides India seem to have achieved significant steps along the road to strength and stability—Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines—but even they confront many problems.

Fundamentally, the problem for American policy in south and southeast Asia is that the countries of this area across Communist China's southern frontiers constitute a huge area of instability. It is this very instability which offers to the Peking regime a tremen-

(Continued on page 116)

William C. Johnstone received his Ph.D. from Stanford University; he taught political science at the George Washington University until 1946. There he also served as Dean of the School of Government. He was Director of U.S.I.S. for India during 1946-1947 and an advisor to the U. S. Diplomatic Mission to Nepal in 1947. He served in the Department of State until 1953. During 1957-1959, he was co-director of the Rangoon-Hopkins Center for Southeast Asian Studies and visiting professor at the University of Rangoon. He has lectured and traveled extensively in south and southeast Asia, most recently in 1962. He is the author of a number of works on Asian politics. His most recent publication is *Burma's Foreign Policy—A Study in Neutralism*, 1963. He is a lecturer at the Foreign Service Institute, Department of State, and a consultant to the RAND Corporation.

As this observer points out, "Pakistan is well aware . . . that it is all too heavily involved in direct relations with the four largest nations in the world. A relatively weak nation, politically and economically as well as militarily, it must walk an international tight rope and must therefore proceed cautiously."

New Directions for Pakistan

By NORMAN D. PALMER

Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania

FOR PAKISTAN, as for India, the months that have passed since the Chinese attack on India in late October, 1962, have been full of trials and alarms. Anti-American and anti-Indian feelings, as well as pro-Russian, pro-Chinese, and pro-neutralist sentiments, have increased. There is considerable point to an observation by the *Far Eastern Economic Review* that Pakistan has become "deeply involved in a crucial reassessment of her foreign relations at a time when her unstable internal politics are in complete confusion."¹

On the other hand, there are some encouraging signs. In foreign affairs, recent flirtations with Communist China are unlikely to lead to any wedding. Anti-American and anti-Indian feelings, so strongly voiced in recent months, may be due more to apprehensions over the consequences to Pakistan of the military build-up of India than to any basic change in Pakistan's attitude toward its greatest neighbor and its major ally. In internal affairs, growing frustrations may be counterbalanced by continuing economic progress, by greater attention to the problems and aspirations of the people of East Pakistan, and by evidences of a willingness on the part of the present regime to broaden the base of Pakistan's new experiment in republican govern-

ment and to proceed with elections in about a year on the basis of a wider franchise.

Ever since independence the foreign relations of Pakistan—and to a significant degree domestic politics as well—have revolved around relations with India. This has been markedly true in the past 18 months. When the Chinese attack on India threatened to develop into a major penetration of the north Indian plains, Pakistan became somewhat concerned for its own security; but this concern ceased to be apparent when the Chinese announced and effected a unilateral withdrawal. From the beginning of the heightened Sino-Indian crisis, Pakistan showed a conspicuous lack of sympathy for India, which it blamed for provoking the Chinese actions and for trying to use these actions as an excuse to strengthen itself *vis-à-vis* Pakistan. Pakistan vigorously protested the extension of emergency military aid to India by its major Western allies, the United States and the United Kingdom. Since the fighting ceased along India's Himalayan frontiers Pakistan has repeatedly protested against Western military assistance to India on a long-term basis.

The reasons for this attitude on Pakistan's part should be clearly understood. India, not China, is considered the real threat; any strengthening of India, the stronger state, is regarded as an added threat to Pakistan. To Pakistan it seems almost incredible that its

¹ "Pakistan Off the Fence?" *Far Eastern Economic Review*, XXXIX (Jan. 3, 1963), 19.

own allies should contribute to the further alteration of the balance of power in the Indian subcontinent, which was very much weighted in India's favor even before the Chinese attack. "The whole plan of augmenting the military strength of a country which is full of expansionist ambitions and has resorted to force more often than any other Asian country in the post-war period," declared *Dawn*, the leading Pakistani newspaper, on July 3, 1963, "is fraught with a serious danger to the security of the smaller countries, especially Pakistan, hostility towards which is the one constant element in India's foreign policy."

Pakistan derives little consolation from the repeated assurances of its allies that aid to India is designed to strengthen India against China, and not against Pakistan, and that if India misuses its military aid by attacking Pakistan the United States and the United Kingdom will come immediately to Pakistan's aid. Pakistan is dubious about all such assurances. The United States and the United Kingdom are far away and have their own preoccupations and interests, whereas India is next door and has an unsavory record of aggression, in Pakistan's view.

HOSTILITY TOWARD INDIA

In the aftermath of the Chinese attack, many people in India and the Western world, and probably in Pakistan as well, hoped and perhaps believed that the two great neighbors of the Indian subcontinent would be brought closer together by the need for common defense against a common danger. This hope soon proved to be illusory, for Pakistan did not even agree that China was a major threat. Hopes were again aroused when Pakistan's President Ayub Khan and India's President Jawaharlal Nehru, under the strong prodding of Duncan Sandys of the United Kingdom and Averell Harriman of the United States, agreed in late November, 1962, to talks on the Kashmir question, first at a ministerial level. These talks opened on December 27, in Rawalpindi. The chief negotiators were Z. A. Bhutto, then Pakistan's Minister for Industries, who became Foreign Minister on

the death of Mohammad Ali on January 23, 1963, and Sardar Swaran Singh, then India's Minister for Railways, who became Minister for Food and Agriculture after the resignation of six members of the Indian Cabinet in August, 1963.

On the eve of the first round of talks the governments of Pakistan and Communist China issued a joint communiqué, announcing that they had reached "agreement in principle" on the location and alignment of the boundary between the two countries, extending for about 275 miles from the Karakoram Pass to the Afghan border. This announcement created an unfavorable atmosphere for the first round of talks on Kashmir between Indian and Pakistani representatives. Five more rounds were held between January and mid-May, 1963—in New Delhi, Karachi, Calcutta, Karachi, and New Delhi—with no significant results.

Between the third and fourth rounds Z. A. Bhutto journeyed to Peking, where on March 2 he signed the border agreement with China. Again India reacted sharply to Pakistan's move. It involved an agreement with a government which had just sent its forces against India. In India's view Pakistan had also yielded to China territory below the "traditional boundary," thus adding to the security problems of the subcontinent, and had entered into an agreement regarding territory which it was occupying illegally. Moreover, Nehru charged, the timing of the agreement "cannot be coincidental. It is deliberate. It does not indicate any desire on the part of Pakistan to arrive at a settlement" regarding Kashmir. The fourth round of talks on Kashmir, held in Calcutta in mid-March, was devoted largely to charges and counter-charges arising from the Sino-Pakistan border agreement.

After two more rounds of talks both sides confessed that "no agreement could be reached," and the talks were ended. Apparently the only reasons for prolonging them through the six fruitless sessions were because neither party wished to be held responsible for their breakdown and because each hoped that the United States and the United King-

dom would bring pressure on the other to make significant concessions. Following the failure of the talks both countries reverted to their previous rather rigid positions, and their mutual relations were at a lower ebb than ever.

Other events since May, 1963, have further exacerbated these relations. Among these are charges and counter-charges regarding long-standing issues in dispute, notably Kashmir; new differences over security and China policies; alleged evictions of Muslims from Tripura and Assam into East Pakistan and from East Pakistan into India; and alleged attacks by Indian troops on the Azad Kashmir side of the cease-fire line in Kashmir and by Pakistani troops on the Indian side of the line. These charges and counter-charges were voiced by responsible leaders of both countries, by members of the Indian Parliament and the Pakistan National Assembly, and by the press of both countries. They were brought dramatically to world attention by a bitter exchange between Madame Pandit of India and Bhutto in the United Nations General Assembly in September and October, 1963. Pakistani sensitivities on Kashmir were further inflamed when Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, who had been Prime Minister of Kashmir for a decade declared shortly after announcing his resignation in August, 1963, that further steps would be taken to integrate Jammu and Kashmir into the Republic of India. Pakistan denounced his statement as a further violation of the United Nations resolutions of August, 1948, and January, 1949, to which India had adhered.

Since the extension of Western military aid to India, Pakistani spokesmen have voiced increasing doubts about the value of Pakistan's allies and alliances. Pakistan has often hinted that it might have to reorient its foreign policy and even "abandon friends and allies," as Foreign Minister Bhutto stated in April, 1963, if "friends and allies" abandoned Pakistan.

These statements, which are representative of certain recurrent themes in official Pakistani statements since the Chinese attack on India, seemed to foreshadow a trend toward

a more "independent" foreign policy. Moderate opposition leaders, including Ayub Khan's brother, Sardar Bahadur Khan, have often attacked the United States and Britain, and have demanded that Pakistan get out of Seato and Cento and follow a more independent foreign policy. Some have talked vaguely of closer ties with the Communist countries. Students at the University of Karachi have demonstrated against Pakistan's allies and in favor of China, shouting "Pakistan China bhai bhai" (reminiscent of the slogan, "Hindi Chini bhai bhai," that used to be heard in India).

A NEW ORIENTATION?

The continuing expressions of irritation at the United States and Britain have been the stock in trade of official and unofficial Pakistani spokesmen for several years. This irritation often produces deep-seated suspicions and serious charges, centering around the feeling that in any real showdown the Western powers, for power-political reasons, would support India against Pakistan.

Charges of this kind are doubtless more a reflection of deep-seated Pakistani neuroses and sensitivities, centering especially around India, than of any basic hostility toward the United States and the United Kingdom. They are indications of the disturbing trend in the relations between Pakistan and its major Western allies in recent years, and especially since October, 1962, and of the increasingly unfavorable climate of opinion in Pakistan as far as the United States and Britain are concerned.

Continuing differences of a serious nature on official and unofficial levels may also jeopardize the extensive working relationships between the United States and Pakistan. This would be a great misfortune, not only for Pakistan (which is heavily dependent on American economic and military aid, on American markets, and on American support in international councils) but for the United States as well. Pakistan is at the moment a disgruntled ally, feeling abused and neglected; it believes that its whole security is being jeopardized by a stronger and more militant

India, supported by Pakistan's own allies.

By a curious coincidence, the same month (September, 1963) in which Pakistan concluded no fewer than six agreements with Communist countries also witnessed what appeared to be a marked improvement in United States-Pakistan relations. Shortly before that time the continuing criticisms of the United States in Pakistan and Pakistan's various agreements with Communist China provoked strong American reactions; soon after Pakistan agreed to grant air rights to China the United States announced the suspension of a \$4.3 million loan for the improvement of the Dacca airport. This action raised questions regarding the future of American economic aid to Pakistan, which has been amounting to about \$350 million a year.

In early September, also, United States Under Secretary of State George Ball visited Pakistan, and conferred with Ayub Khan and other Pakistan leaders. Later in the month, the Foreign Minister and the Finance Minister of Pakistan visited Washington. These visits and talks seemed to ease United States-Pakistan tensions considerably. They were followed almost immediately by an announcement of a \$70 million American loan to Pakistan for the purchase of iron, steel and other products. Very shortly before George Ball's visit, criticisms of the United States in the Pakistani press were noticeably toned down, obviously at the suggestion of the Government. These more favorable omens may herald a return to a more cooperative and more tolerant relationship between the United States and Pakistan.

SINO-PAKISTAN BORDER AGREEMENT

In the United States, as well as in India, Pakistan has often been accused of capitalizing upon India's crisis with China by bringing additional pressure through a series of Sino-Pakistani agreements. There may be some basis for this accusation, although Pakistani spokesmen vigorously deny it. They point out that the border agreement with China, the most highly publicized and criticized of several Sino-Pakistan agreements since October, 1962, was, as Aziz Ahmed

(then Pakistan's Ambassador to the United States and now Foreign Secretary) declared in an address at the Naval War College in May, 1963, "merely the final act in a chain of events which were set in motion four years ago."

The formal talks on the boundary question began in Peking on October 12, 1962, eight days before the Chinese attack on India. Pakistan insists that it is natural to enter into an agreement with China regarding their common border, that by this agreement it did not cede a square foot which it had previously occupied, but instead gained some 750 square miles of territory, and that by reaching a definite border agreement it was doing a service to its Cento and Seato allies by eliminating the danger of trouble over disputed boundary claims, such as India has experienced.

Whatever the merits of the Pakistani view, the border agreement with China is symbolic of the change in Sino-Pakistan relations during the past four years, at a time when Sino-Indian relations have gone from bad to worse. It is only one of a series of agreements between Pakistan and China since October, 1962. In January, 1963, the two countries concluded a trade agreement; in August, an air agreement giving each landing and on-flying rights in the other country; and in September, a barter agreement to exchange Pakistani jute for Chinese cement. In October, a five-man official delegation went to Peking to participate in China's October revolution celebrations. Official Pakistani spokesmen and the Pakistani press and other vocal organs of public sentiment have often referred favorably to China, and have welcomed the more friendly approach to the Communist giant of Asia.

There seems to be little prospect, however, that the new Sino-Pakistan relationship will become a really intimate one, or will lead to a pro-China reorientation of policy. China's offer, made in November, 1962, to enter into a nonaggression pact with Pakistan was not accepted. Despite Indian charges and Bhutto's cryptic reference to the assistance of "the largest state in Asia" if India attacked

Pakistan, there seems to be little reason to doubt the assurances of responsible Pakistani spokesmen that there are no secret military understandings between Pakistan and China.

In addition to the several agreements with China, Pakistan has concluded a number of agreements with other Communist countries since October, 1962. These include barter agreements with the U.S.S.R. (cement for jute), Poland (also cement for jute), Hungary (electrical products for jute), and Czechoslovakia (machinery and equipment for chrome ore). Several agreements for cultural exchanges have also been concluded.

While Pakistan has apparently attempted to exploit the Sino-Indian rift, at least to the extent of exercising some leverage on India through China, it has taken no position on the Sino-Soviet dispute. Its recent associations with China have not been at the expense of its more limited but somewhat older ties with the Soviet Union, dating from the conclusion of an oil agreement in 1960. It has repeatedly expressed an interest in closer relations with the U.S.S.R., and at the same time it has publicly voiced its unhappiness over Russian support of India on the Kashmir issue. In September, 1963, it reached an "agreement in principle" with a Soviet mission in Karachi for granting the national airlines of the Soviet Union and Pakistan landing and onflying rights in each other's country. (The formal agreement was signed in Karachi on October 9.) This was the first time the Soviet Union had granted such rights to any foreign airline. In the same month a 30-member cultural group from Pakistan began a 21-day tour of the Soviet Union.

Pakistan is well aware, if not all of its critics are, that it is all too heavily involved in direct relations with the four largest nations in the world. A relatively weak nation, politically and economically as well as militarily, it must walk an international tight-rope and must therefore proceed cautiously. Its relations with India are unsatisfactory and alarming, with the United States both close and distant, and with China and the Soviet Union tentative and exploratory. Its leaders must conduct relations with all of these giants

in accordance with their best conceptions of the national interest. It is hardly surprising that they follow policies which do not always commend themselves to any of their larger neighbors, or to the United States. Nor is it surprising that, in their disillusionment with the fruits of their previous policies of alignment, they now favor a greater diversification of diplomatic as well as trade relations. The keys to their thinking and policies lie in the internal weaknesses of the country, and in their preoccupation with India.

In September, 1961, because of new crises arising from long-standing differences, Afghanistan broke off diplomatic relations with Pakistan, and until mid-1963 the two Muslim neighbors eyed each other with undisguised hostility. The United States was involved in the dispute, not only because of its concern over bad relations between two states in a strategically vital area, but also because the severance of relations and the consequent closing of the Pakistan-Afghan border cut off the normal access route for American aid to Afghanistan. Efforts of the United States to be helpful in the resolution of the dispute were unavailing.

The Shah of Iran, who also offered his good offices, was more successful. On May 29, 1963, at a meeting in Tehran, representatives of Pakistan and Afghanistan signed an agreement for the resumption of diplomatic relations, and a few weeks later exchanged ambassadors. Afghanistan has been permitted to open consulates in Peshawar and Quetta, and trade agencies, for a limited period, in Peshawar and Chaman; and Pakistan may, if it wishes, reopen its consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad.

Pakistan has not been at all perturbed by the many evidences in recent years of anti-Indian feeling in Nepal, but until recently its own relations with Nepal have been almost non-existent. Pakistan does not yet have an embassy in Kathmandu. King Mahendra made a state visit to Pakistan in September, 1961, and was apparently greatly impressed with Ayub Khan and with Pakistan's experiment in Basic Democracies. The new Constitution, which the King promulgated in

April, 1963, establishing what he likes to call a system of panchayat democracy, seems to have been patterned in part after Pakistani models.

In the aftermath of the Chinese attack on India, Pakistan took a greater interest in the Himalayan kingdom not far from its borders. In May, 1963, Ayub Khan was warmly welcomed during a four-day state visit to Nepal, the first such visit by a Pakistani head of state.

POLITICAL ACTIVITY REVIVED

In internal politics as in external policies, Pakistan has been moving uncertainly in new directions toward still ill-defined goals. Since the official ending of martial law and the resumption of constitutional government, at least in form, in June, 1962, political activity has revived, to a limited degree. Bowing to internal pressures, Ayub Khan has acquiesced in a number of steps which he presumably disapproved. He has permitted the revival of political groupings in the National Assembly and in the country at large, although these groupings can hardly be described as fully operational political parties. Most of the older, discredited political parties have reappeared in one form or another, but under more controlled conditions. Most of the formerly prominent political leaders, however, are still debarred from active participation in political life.

The Muslim League has reappeared in two parts, opposed to each other. One, known as the Conventionist Muslim League, supports the Ayub Khan regime. To everyone's surprise Ayub himself announced on May 22, 1963, that he had decided to join this branch of the Muslim League, "so as to fill the political vacuum to ensure stability in the country." Some prominent Muslim Leaguers, including Daultana and Ayub's brother, Sadar Bahadur Khan, refused to support the Conventionist Muslim League, and instead formed another group, called the Councilors Muslim League.

² "Outspoken Attacks in Pakistan on President Ayub," dispatch from Rawalpindi, *London Times*, July 8, 1963.

³ "Pakistan Perspective Today, *Pakistan Quarterly*, (Winter, 1962), 6.

They were able to persuade Khwaja Nazimuddin, a former Prime Minister and Governor General of Pakistan, to emerge from a political retirement of nearly a decade to head the new opposition grouping.

In January, 1962, H. S. Suhrawardy, a former Prime Minister, and perhaps the ablest politician Pakistan has produced, was arrested on a charge of "activities prejudicial to the integrity and safety of Pakistan." Upon his release in the following August he took the initiative in forming a National Democratic Front, which was designed to unite a number of former political parties (without attempting to revive them in their old forms) under the single demand for a more democratic constitution.

After a promising beginning, the National Democratic Front was unable to capitalize on the growing dissatisfaction with the Ayub Khan regime, and even with Ayub Khan himself. In January, a government ordinance expanded the scope of the definition of a political party to bring the N.D.F., in all probability, within the purview of tighter restrictions on the operations of all parties. Suhrawardy, who had long been in ill health, died of a heart attack on December 5, 1963, in Beirut, Lebanon, at the age of 70.

The firm policies of the Government and the disarray of the opposition groupings have inhibited political activity. Hence "the Opposition is reduced to vocalizing in the National Assembly and there too the chorus is becoming discordant." The result, in the words of the *Times* (London), "is perhaps best described a teeming stagnation."² A Pakistan assessment is suggestive:

"Until some new parties emerge with clear cut and substantial programmes, the public life of the country will continue to be desultory and meaningless. The numerical strength of parties in the assemblies is bound to shift from session to session until some stabilizing basis of principles and programmes is introduced into the political parties."³

Political life may revive as the country approaches the first nation-wide general elections in its history, which Ayub Khan has promised for May, 1965. Apparently he has also agreed to follow the recommendation of

the Franchise Commission, to permit elections to the provincial assemblies and the National Assembly on the basis of universal franchise. This will widen the franchise to include far more than the 80,000-odd "Basic Democrats" who participated in the elections to the assemblies in April and May, 1962, under the new constitution.

Possibly Chalmers Roberts is correct in his view that "Pakistan is neither an authoritarian state nor a democracy in the Western sense,"⁴ but it is still essentially under the control of a relatively small group, not averse to authoritarian practices. What Selig Harrison has called "the palace politics of the Ayub Khan regime" revolves around the top leadership of the Army and Air Force and the Civil Service and perhaps also, as he suggests, around "the aggressive governor of the Western provinces, the Khan of Kalabagh."⁵ Students and intellectuals generally are still disaffected, feeling that they have no place in the present political life of the country and little access to the ruling groups. East Pakistanis are still suspicious of West Pakistanis, and almost all other groups are suspicious of Punjabis. The Army is disturbed by the obvious signs of political stagnation and even of disaffection with the Ayub Khan regime. Ayub is under considerable pressure both to liberalize his regime and to institute further controls. If he falls between these conflicting pressures, either the Army will again step in or political leaders will reassert themselves. In such an event, Ayub might try to identify himself with one or the other grouping, but he might be repudiated by both.

The internal stresses and strains which Pakistan is now experiencing may be necessary stages of political growth. They should be viewed in perspective, and measured against the difficulties of the past and the real progress that is being made in certain directions.

Two important factors which will affect the future of Pakistan are the quality of its leadership and the success or failure of

⁴ "Pakistan Doing Well Despite Big Problems," *Washington Post*, March 17, 1963.

⁵ "Palace Politics in Ayub's Land," *Washington Post*, Sept. 14, 1963.

the efforts in the direction of economic development. In the economic arena the obstacles are great—including a very low standard of living, social attitudes and ignorance, and a population, now in excess of 94 million, that is expanding at the rate of 2.3 per cent or more each year (some late estimates are as high as 2.6 per cent).

On the other hand, there are encouraging signs that the rate of economic growth is greater than the rate of population expansion, and that the main targets of the Second Five Year Plan (1960-1965), now in its final stages, will be achieved or surpassed. The rate of industrial growth is currently one of the highest in the world. Substantial amounts of foreign aid have been forthcoming, amounting to 40 per cent or more of total Plan expenditures, and the climate for foreign investment is generally favorable—"the most favorable in South Asia," according to official Pakistan government sources. The Third Five Year Plan, covering the years 1965-1970, is now in the blueprint stage. This envisions a total expenditure of approximately \$9 billion, as compared with about \$2.8 billion during the First Plan and \$4.8 billion during the Second.

Increasing attention is being given to the economic development of East Pakistan. The emergency measures to deal with the dislocation and damage resulting from the cyclone and tidal wave in the Chittagong area in early June, 1963—affecting some 2.4 million people—were prompt and generally effective, and the task of long-term rehabilitation of the stricken area and of the prevention of periodic recurrences of similar disasters has been undertaken with vigor and determination. The

(Continued on page 114)

Norman D. Palmer has visited Pakistan six times during the past decade. He is Chairman of the International Relations Graduate Program and a member of the South Asia Regional Studies Program at the University of Pennsylvania. He toured South Asia as a Research Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations in 1961-1962, and is now writing about Pakistan.

Recent events in India indicate that support for the Congress party is weakening; after recent by-elections "the prestige of the ruling party was at its lowest." This author notes that "The picture that India presents in the sixteenth year of her independence is indeed most discouraging." Still, it offers a great opportunity for India's leaders.

Challenge for Indian Leadership

By M. V. PYLEE

Visiting Professor of Political Science, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

ANY REALISTIC assessment of India's policies toward her immediate neighbours and her role in international affairs must examine her historical background, socio-economic conditions, political institutions, and the ideals and aspirations cherished by her leaders and their ability to translate these into reality.

After a long period of peaceful but massive struggle against colonialism, India became independent in August, 1947. Independence was not an unmixed blessing because India was divided to form the two nations of India and Pakistan. Industries were cut off from their raw materials; the pattern of agriculture was disrupted; railways and civil services were severed; nearly eight million refugees, leaving homes and lands behind, streamed into the new India.

India's socio-economic philosophy reflected the problems of a large underdeveloped nation. The most important concern of the government at the time of independence was how to bring the nation forward into the modern world. The government had to give the newly-achieved political freedom meaning, in terms of higher living standards and more opportunities for the Indian masses who lived in abject poverty; it had to do away with the antiquated economic system and usher in modern techniques of agricultural and industrial production; it needed to remove widespread illiteracy and ignorance

and the centuries-old artificial social barriers of caste, rank, status and unequal education which had practically destroyed the dynamic character of society in India.

The extent of India's poverty was outside the experience of and, for many, beyond the imagination of the West. It is perhaps impossible to describe what such poverty meant in terms of human beings and human lives. Certainly the most that could be said for the living standards of the millions in India was that they were a testimony to the human capacity for survival.

Thus the immediate problems which India faced in the wake of independence were poverty, unemployment, a stagnant agriculture and industry, great inequalities of income and opportunity and a mounting population. One must add to this the immediate expectation of the people that independence itself would solve India's problems, that the poverty and backwardness so long linked with colonialism would almost automatically disappear along with colonial rule.

It was only natural under these circumstances that India's leaders had to focus on the development of the nation and its people. At the same time, they had to keep in view India's own traditions, and scientific and technological advances in the industrial nations. They were convinced that rapid economic and social development was necessary and that it required decisive government action.

They were equally convinced that development should come only through peaceful democratic means that ensured individual freedom, dignity and initiative. The constitution of India as a whole and particularly its Preamble, the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy bear eloquent testimony to this belief.

India's peaceful attainment of independence, her decision to continue as a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, her determination to build up a truly democratic, secular state and her passionate support for the ideals and programs of the United Nations created in the Western world an initial reaction of appreciation and good will. The Western democracies under the leadership of the United States took it for granted that India would support their policies, especially in their cold war struggle against Soviet Russia and her satellites. But it soon became clear that India did not want to enter the arena of the cold war or commit herself irrevocably to either power bloc.

From India's point of view, there were good reasons for this. First of all, she was an Asian power, and her interests lay primarily in the stability, security and peaceful progress of Asia, particularly south and south-east Asia. Her immediate interest was economic development in India and this she thought was possible only if there were peace.

Having experienced colonial rule for over two centuries, India was also suspicious of any alignment that might endanger her political freedom. And, after all, she could not be expected to hold the views of the Western powers on colonialism and imperialism. She could not ignore the fact that there were still many countries in Asia and Africa struggling to become independent. She was also conscious of the cold reality that a totalitarian Communist regime was established in China sharing a common frontier of over 2,000 miles.

Her joining either power bloc might have tilted the precarious balance which perhaps ensured the uneasy peace. On the other hand, India would possibly be able to play a role of mediation between the power blocs if

the situation were propitious. Above all, it was India's conviction, rooted in her philosophical traditions, that there was no absolute white or black in this world but only shades of grey. Taking all these factors into consideration, India was convinced that non-alignment would best serve her interests.

This did not mean, however, that India was to remain neutral in every dispute. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru said in a New York speech in October, 1949:

We are neither blind to reality nor do we propose to acquiesce in any challenge to man's freedom from whatever quarter it may come. Where freedom is threatened or where aggression takes place, we cannot be and shall not be neutral. . . .

Yet India's neutralism was the main source of misunderstanding between the West, particularly the United States, and India. In December, 1956, United States Vice-President Richard Nixon condemned "the brand of neutralism that makes no moral distinction between the Communist world and the free world." Nehru's reply was that he did not believe that "the world can be divided up into good and evil" and that "it is not democratic to want all people to think the same as you do."

DIFFERENCES WITH THE U. S.

Apart from this general difference in approach, there were also specific differences. The United States was convinced of the aggressive and expansionist designs of Communist China, especially after the Sino-Soviet treaty of February, 1950. Chinese aggression in Tibet, Korea and Indochina provided unmistakable evidence of this. Hence, to stem the tide of Communist expansion, and to ensure the containment of the Communist threat and the preservation of peace, the United States sought a series of defensive alliances: Nato, Cento and Seato.

India, on the other hand, wanted to develop amicable relations with China and hoped to build a neutral area, with Chinese cooperation, in south and southeast Asia. India also believed that, given good will, the Chinese Communists would settle down

to peaceful internal reconstruction, and that nationalism would ultimately triumph over communism. Acting on these presumptions, India became a passionate spokesman for the Chinese Communists in the councils of the world; every time she spoke for China, she came into conflict with the United States.

India's opposition to military alliances stemmed also from the view that such alliances tended to create tension and suspicion. India was particularly unhappy about Pakistan's membership in Cento and Seato. On the one hand, she feared a build-up of Pakistan's military strength. On the other, arming Pakistan would directly affect India's developmental efforts by forcing her to devote her scarce resources to defence. Nehru complained that the formation of these alliances with Pakistan as a member had brought the cold war to India's borders. "In a sense," he said, "they tend to encircle us."

There was also a widespread suspicion in India about the United States attitude toward India's conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir. Many Indians thought that United States irritation with India's non-alignment policy was reflected in her more friendly attitude toward Pakistan. India felt that in discussions on the Kashmir problem in the United Nations the United States was throwing her weight on Pakistan's side because of Pakistan's membership in the military alliance. For this reason, India sought Soviet support as a counterbalance whenever the Kashmir problem was discussed in the Security Council.

From 1956 onwards, however, there was a perceptible improvement in Indian-United States relations. This appears to have been the product of two main trends. India was aware of events in the Communist world. Many Indians began to suspect Communist claims and pretensions. The denunciation of Stalin was followed by the Hungarian uprising and Soviet intervention in Hungary, Chinese Communist attacks on Yugoslavia, the Tibetan revolt and its ruthless suppression by China, unending intrusions on Indian territory by the Chinese Communists, unwillingness on the part of the Chinese to settle the Sino-Indian border problem and Chinese

efforts to build up Communist fifth columns in Asian countries.

Secondly, India appreciated the American stand on the Suez crisis, which seemed to pave the way for better understanding and the consequent Nehru-Eisenhower meeting in Washington in 1956. In 1959, President Eisenhower received the greatest welcome any visiting foreign dignitary ever received in India. The election of John F. Kennedy as United States President in 1960 and his deep understanding and appreciation of India's problems and policies gave yet another boost to growing friendly relations between India and the United States. This was reflected in Nehru's Washington visit in November, 1961. There were, of course, differences of opinion on Indian-Pakistani relations, on Kashmir and on the Indian action in Goa in 1961. Yet the unmistakable trend of increasingly better understanding between Washington and New Delhi was clear.

Nothing brought India closer to the United States than the spontaneous and instantaneous assistance that she received from the United States in the wake of the massive Chinese invasion of India in October, 1962. The Chinese attack was an eye-opener for India. Speaking in Parliament on November 7, 1962, Nehru confessed that the Chinese invasion had awakened in India a new sense of realism:

On the other hand, certain developments in 1963 brought about a good deal of frustration and disappointment. Of these, the most important from the Indian point of view was the decision of the United States Congress not to aid the proposed Bokharo steel plant. For the past few years, India had had expectations of American aid for this public sector enterprise. Had it materialised, Bokharo would have become the fourth public sector steel plant in India established through foreign assistance (the previous three being Rourkela, Bhilai and Durgapur built through the aid of West Germany, the Soviet Union and Britain respectively). Indian planners hoped for a substantial increase in steel production through Bokharo before the end of the third five year plan in 1966. When the

late President Kennedy publicly supported United States aid for the Bokhoro project, the Indian people were certain that the aid would come even if it came a little late. Even educated Indians, not fully conversant with the structure of the American government, found it difficult to understand why American aid was not forthcoming.

In contrast to many major disappointments, a number of recent agreements strengthened Indo-American relations. Among these were the United States agreement to lend India a substantial sum for the erection of an atomic reactor plant, readiness to help India with a plant for the manufacture of small ammunition, provision of technical consultative service and training facilities for Indian personnel, and assistance toward augmentation of the fleet of transport air craft. Mention must also be made of the July, 1963, agreement on a United States-British plan for joint training exercises for Indian Air Force personnel in the use of radar and ground equipment.

PROBLEMS OF PAKISTAN

One of the greatest stumbling blocks to Indo-American cooperation is the continuing existence of unfriendly relations between India and Pakistan. As long as India and Pakistan fail to settle their differences, United States policy in south Asia is bound to remain comparatively ineffective. Every move to strengthen the ties between India and the United States or between Pakistan and the United States is looked upon with suspicion either by the Pakistanis or the Indians. Soon after the Chinese attack on India in October, 1962, the United States, in collaboration with Britain, made a serious attempt to settle the Kashmir problem by persuading India and Pakistan to discuss the problem with a view to finding a solution. Representatives of India and Pakistan held six rounds of unsuccessful talks during 1962-1963. Even while these talks were going on, Pakistan entered into a border agreement with Communist China; she conceded to China some 3,000 square miles of territory to which India has a legitimate claim because it forms a part of Jammu and Kashmir.

If there were any country outside the Communist camp which rejoiced in the Chinese attack on India, it was Pakistan. In fact, almost overnight Pakistan became China's great friend and admirer. This was manifested not only in the border agreement but also in the air agreement under which Pakistan gained air service to Tokyo via China in return for reciprocal rights granted to China to operate a similar service to Dacca and Karachi. Pakistan ignored United States advice against such an agreement and maintained that Communist China was "a great Asian neighbour." Pakistan has also become a great champion of Communist China's admission to the United Nations.

Relations between India and Pakistan have consequently deteriorated. Pakistan's actions during India's difficult days with China led the Indian people to feel that Pakistan has no intention of friendliness. Until Pakistan's policy undergoes a substantial change, there is little hope of friendly relations between India and Pakistan or a solution of the Kashmir problem.

Ever since Communist China proclaimed a unilateral withdrawal of her forces from Indian territory in November, 1962, she has been trying to bring India to a conference table. But she has not yet been successful. India wants China first to prove her good faith. She has asked China to restore the position existing prior to September 8, 1962, all along the frontier. It is India's stand that the fruits of aggression must be abandoned before there can be talk of a peaceful settlement of the border question.

In December, 1962, on the initiative of the Prime Minister of Ceylon, Mrs. Bandaranaike, a conference of six non-aligned Afro-Asian countries—Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, Indonesia and the United Arab Republic—was held at Colombo to discuss the conflict between India and Communist China. The conference made certain unanimous proposals. It was suggested that:

1. In the western sector, the Chinese should carry out their 20 kilometer withdrawal as suggested in the Chinese cease-fire proposals of November 21, 1962. At the same time, the

Indian government should keep its existing military position.

2. Pending a final solution of the border dispute, the area vacated by the Chinese military withdrawals would be a demilitarised zone administered by civilian posts of both sides, without prejudice to the rights of the previous presence in that area of both India and China.

3. In the eastern sector, the line of actual control in the areas recognised by both governments could serve as a cease-fire line. Remaining areas in this section could be settled in future discussions.

4. The problems of the middle sector should be solved without resorting to force.

The proposals were presented to both India and China. India sought certain clarifications of the proposals and subsequently accepted them *in toto*. On the contrary, the Chinese officially rejected their essential feature after a show of initial enthusiasm. The Chinese stand appears to be that the proposals were only a starting point. India believes that China could begin by accepting the Colombo proposals in their entirety as India has done. As of now the matter stands there. India is now bent upon arming herself fully to deter the designs of any potential aggressor.

This does not mean that the border problem with China must remain unresolved. India has proclaimed her willingness to discuss the matter with the Chinese as soon as China accepts the Colombo proposals. Prime Minister Nehru has declared that India would place the matter before the World Court.

INTERNAL STRENGTH

Meanwhile most Indians today believe that the border problem with China can be satisfactorily settled only if India is strengthened internally. In this connection, it is pertinent to consider recent political developments. Of these, the most important are three: the defeat of the Congress party candidates in three crucial parliamentary by-elections; the first no-confidence motion against the Nehru government; and the "Kamaraj Plan" and the consequent ministerial changes. All of these are intertwined.

The defeat of the Congress party in the three by-elections did not affect the party's parliamentary strength in any significant manner but had a stunning effect on its prestige. In all three, those elected were leaders of the Opposition and Nehru's severest critics, namely, J. B. Kripalani (former Praja Socialist leader), M. R. Masani (Secretary of the Swatanthra party) and R. M. Lohia (leader of the Socialist party of India). The Opposition characterised these election reverses as a vote of no-confidence in the Nehru government by the people as a whole. They carried the battle to the floor of Parliament by formally moving a motion of no-confidence against the Government for the first time. Although the motion was decisively defeated at the end of a marathon debate that lasted about a week, the prestige of the ruling party was at its lowest. Something drastic was needed. In this context, the Kamaraj plan took shape.

The plan is named for its principal author, K. Kamaraj, the former Chief Minister and undisputed leader of Madras State. It aims at recapturing the Congress party's spirit of service and sacrifice and revitalising the party organisation and the government. Kamaraj is convinced that the Congress party will continue in power for a considerable time. There is no single effective political party that can replace it in the near future. But the Congress party is fast losing touch with the masses. Factions within the party and the struggle for power have led Congressmen to

(Continued on page 114)

M. V. Pylee is a director on the staff of the Administrative Staff College of India. He has taught at the universities of Lucknow, Patna and Delhi and was head of the department of economic administration in the Delhi School of Economics at Delhi University. Dr. Pylee, who collaborated with Columbia University on a project on international joint business ventures as director of the area study on India, is the author of *India's Constitution at Work* (1955); *Constitutional Government in India* (1960); and *India's Constitution* (1962).

From Democracy to Dictatorship in Burma

By JOSEF SILVERSTEIN

Assistant Professor of Government, Wesleyan University

"The path of democracy is the most difficult that man has ever trodden . . . but its rewards are so great that no difficulty . . . should be considered insurmountable."

THESE WORDS, spoken by Burma's Prime Minister, U Nu, at the opening of parliament in April, 1960, were not empty rhetoric. To those who heard him, they recalled the hopes and aspirations of the founding fathers in 1947 and the troubled reality after independence. They pointed up the fact that the new government took office with high hopes of uniting the nation, restoring public confidence and democratic government.

The path of democracy proved much more difficult than Nu had anticipated: on March 2, 1962, it came to a dead end when the military, led by General Ne Win, overthrew the government, imprisoned the elected leaders and took all power to itself.

The new road of dictatorship began without a blueprint; over the past two years its direction has often changed abruptly as the coup leaders tried different ways to translate the socialist goals of the pre-independence nationalist movement into reality and to bring peace and unity to this rapidly developing society.

The swift and dramatic changes in Burma

during the past four years climaxed a decade and a half of deteriorating civil leadership and growing public apathy toward parliamentary and democratic procedures. They brought, in their train, a gradually widening acceptance of the idea that only the military was capable of leading Burma back to the road marked out by the founding fathers. How well they are succeeding, and why democracy failed, can only be answered by examining the succession of events between 1960 and 1964 and the cultural-social milieu in which it took place.

At the time Nu resumed office as Prime Minister in April, 1960,¹ there was good reason for believing that he would be able to carry out his campaign program and promises. The national elections, held in February, had produced an overwhelming majority for his party² in both houses of parliament. Out of a total electorate of 6.6 million people, the *Pyidaungsu* gained 53 percent of the vote. Nu's supporters included peasants, urban workers, businessmen, students, professionals, Buddhist clergy and large segments of the ethnic and religious minorities—a real cross-section of the Burmese people.

His major opponent in the election, the Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League (A.F.P.F.L.),³ accepted its defeat with good grace and promised publicly to cooperate with the new government whenever possible and to criticize constructively when necessary. The only known real opposition to the government came from the dissident rebels—

¹ U Nu had been ousted from an earlier term as Prime Minister in October, 1958.

² U Nu's party at the time of the election was called the Clean AFPFL. He had retained his claim to the original name of the nationalist party which was in power from 1948 to 1958. After the election, he changed the name of his party to the *Pyidaungsu* or Union Party.

³ During and prior to the election, Nu's opponents called themselves the Stable AFPFL. After the election, they dropped the prefix.

ethnic minorities and Communist parties⁴—which, in the past, had harassed and attacked all legal government in Burma. Although the rebel number was small and their members were scattered and divided, their hit-and-run attacks upon isolated villages and unprotected transports forced all governments—civil or military—to maintain a large force of soldiers in continuous pursuit.

The unknown factor in the political equation at the time was the real attitude of the military. Earlier General Ne Win and his senior officers had governed under the constitution for 18 months (1958 to 1960) as the caretaker government. They had succeeded in maintaining law and order, cleaning up the cities, making improvements in the administration of government and state enterprises and holding elections in which the party they did not favor was able to win an overwhelming popular majority. However, to accomplish these and other tasks, the military had used harsh methods, was insensitive to the people and impatient with the democratic process.

The election results stunned and embittered the military officers, who felt that the people did not understand and appreciate the work they had done. Many of them feared that the victorious party might undo their reforms and reestablish the corrupt and inept systems of the past. Despite these feelings, the military leaders had surrendered power in April, 1960, and returned to their professional tasks. But it was clear that they were going to watch the government carefully and that they were ready to return to power if the civil leaders failed again.

⁴ There are two Communist parties in Burma which openly use the name. The Burma Communist Party led by Than Tun is sometimes referred to as the White Flag Communist Party and its program and tactics are more nearly those of the Russian Communist Party than any other. The Communist Party of Burma led by Thakin Soe is sometimes referred to as the Red Flag Communist Party and is more radical and extreme in its tactics and program. It went into revolt prior to independence and has remained in active opposition ever since.

⁵ Kachin is one of the states now comprising Burma. It was formed at the time of Burmese independence in 1948 from the Myitkyina and Bhamo Districts.

Nu's political program was limited and precise: to restore public confidence in democratic government and to remove the causes of national disunity. To accomplish the first task, he proposed to liberalize and open up his party so that the leaders were closer to the members. He also sought to insure free and fair elections in the future by having parliament create an independent election commission. He planned to widen the separation between politicians and government servants to produce a freer, more effective and creative bureaucracy. Above all, he proposed that parliament and his government examine ways and means for increasing and protecting the constitutional rights of the people. Having claimed, from as early as February, 1959, that his party was the victim of political persecution, he promised to make it possible for the opposition to speak and criticize without fear of arrest or harassment.

To gain his second major objective, national unity, he proposed as we will see later in more detail to support Arakanese and Mon demands for statehood within the Union; to show greater concern and interest in the problems of the other minorities and to unify the religious majority by making Buddhism the state religion. He promised the business community a larger role in developing the economy so that the nation could progress and the people could enjoy an improved standard of living. He called upon the political groups still in open rebellion to lay down their arms and return to society and end, once and for all, the problem of insecurity in Burma.

During its short tenure, the Nu government succeeded in passing a constitutional amendment to create an independent election commission and in introducing another amendment, which, if parliament had been able to complete its work, would have strengthened and broadened the rights and protections of the people. Also to its credit stood the informal agreements among all major parties regarding campaigning, use of government vehicles and radio during the period of election and the choice of a Kachin⁵ leader as the next President of the Union of Burma. The

government also made progress in writing a modest economic plan, in preparing to take a national census and in encouraging agricultural production and export. These and other plans, however promising, failed to have any real effect because they were never fully implemented.

The failures of Nu's government dim the memory of the successes because they contributed to the chain of events which resulted in the coup. At the top of this list stands the record of his party. If the *Pyidaungsu* and the government had a dedicated and incorruptible leader in U Nu, he, in turn, did not have a devoted and self-sacrificing party and administration to support him. Rivalry among his followers developed shortly after the administration began, when it became known that Nu planned to retire from politics at the end of his term in office. The *Thakins*, old party followers with strong Socialist leanings, contested for power with the *U-Bos*, a group relatively new to party politics with liberal values and goals.

As the factions formed, Nu tried to heal the breach by threatening to resign immediately. This maneuver failed. Nu, in desperation, decided to elevate himself above the struggle. He wanted the contestants to settle their differences by democratic procedures within the party, with the proviso that they close ranks after the contest was over. The power issue was settled by a vote in January, 1962, but by then, the breach was irreparable. Name calling, public accusations of corruption and crime, and questionable tactics by both sides undermined public confidence in party government. The *Thakin-U-Bo* issue permeated the cabinet; together with incompetence and self-seeking among a number of ministers, it brought the government and the party into disrepute. Clearly, Nu failed in his responsibility to build a strong and dedicated party which could stand as a model of democratic organization and to choose a cabinet of able and devoted servants who could earn the respect and loyalty of the public.

National unity was impaired by a number of acts which, in their origin, were intended to strengthen it. The establishment of a state

religion is a good example. In fact, the issue need not have arisen at all since Burma's constitution—in its original form—gave Buddhism "a special position." Further, it was acknowledged by all that the government and the A.F.P.F.L. leaders were patrons of the faith. This, however, did not satisfy all Buddhists. Nu, for one, hoped to use the state religion issue as a way to unite all Buddhists—over 80 per cent of the population—and raise the general moral level by kindling more religious interest. What he failed to consider fully was that this measure might be viewed by the religious minorities as a threat to the free status of their faiths.

When parliament began consideration of an amendment on this issue, tension was so strong it was necessary to station armed police in the major cities. Nu, at this point, realized the deep unrest the measure was causing and reacted by proposing still another amendment, which would restate the original constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. Both measures passed, but the division created by them did not close. However, this issue further diminished Nu's prestige as a leader and undermined confidence in the democratic method of operation as a means for protecting personal rights and interests.

MINORITY DISCONTENT

The frail structure of national unity was weakened further by the way Nu handled the statehood issue and the discontent of the ethnic minorities. Nu's behavior on the statehood issue must be considered against the background of the larger problem of ethnic majority-minority relations. When the Union was being formed in 1947–1948, the key problem facing the nationalist leaders was how to win and hold the loyalty of the minorities. The solution they developed was that the largest of the ethnic minorities, living in fairly compact areas on the periphery of the Union, be given states of their own and limited power over their own affairs. Following independence, friction developed between some of the minorities and the government, and resulted in open revolt by factions of the Karens and Mons.

During this crisis, the other ethnic minorities stood firm with the central government and helped save the Union. Once the major threat of secession passed, some of the other minorities began to voice their discontent. The Shans and Kayahs—who had states of their own—were guaranteed (by the Constitution) the right of secession, if they wanted it, in 1958. They did not withdraw from the Union, although, at that time, a number of their leaders did begin to agitate for greater state autonomy.

In 1959, the Caretaker Government had been successful in persuading the feudal chiefs among the Shans and Kayahs to surrender their hereditary and constitutional rights in exchange for payment. However, this did not satisfy all the Shan chiefs and beginning late that year considerable resistance was instigated. Some of the chiefs organized a movement to regain political power within their state and to win greater state autonomy from the Union; a few of the chiefs went into open revolt. This resistance sparked similar movements among dissident Kachins and Kayahs; they, together with the Karen rebels and the remnants of the alien Chinese Nationalist Army, presented a new and serious challenge to the Union.

During this same period, minorities, such as the Arakanese and Mons, living in Burma proper agitated for states of their own. In seeking to meet the Mons and Arakanese goal of separate states within the Union, Nu antagonized many residents in the area of the proposed states who were opposed to his plan. By 1961, minority discontent in the Union had grown to serious proportions and the government of Burma was forced to find a new and lasting solution. Nu's original approach to the problem had been to give positions of importance—the presidency of the Union, high cabinet posts and diplomatic assignments—to the leaders of the minorities in order to demonstrate that they were a genuine part of the Union. He had coupled this with a discussion of controversial issues with the aim of finding temporary solutions which would reduce tensions. Faced with resolute opposition from the minorities, his

methods failed to produce even a tentative solution.

Early in 1962, he sponsored a federal seminar in which all the nation's leaders—Burman and ethnic minority—were given a chance to air their grievances and suggest solutions. In February, because of the impending seminar and on the advice of the A.F.P.F.L. leaders, Nu withdrew the Arakan Statehood Bill in order not to prejudice his position at the coming meeting. This action, without pre-warning, angered the Arakanese who felt he had broken his promise. Further, the seminar never completed its work because, on March 2, the military overthrew the government. The new rulers placed a number of the minority leaders, together with members of the Nu government, under arrest; the remainder were sent home. Thus the ethnic minority problem carried over to the new regime.

The handling of the minority problem by Nu and his government had been questioned by both sides. The minorities felt that he procrastinated and refused to take steps necessary to force the majority community to recognize their rights and aspirations. The majority community, on the other hand, lost confidence in Nu's approach because it felt that he favored the minorities and would concede to their extreme demands, even going so far as to permit their secession.

Nu's attempt at democracy failed in Burma partly because of the inadequacies of the party and leadership. It also failed because the majority of the people, living in the rural parts of Burma, had little understanding of, and practically no commitment to, its ideals and institutions. Their culture and traditions taught them that government—any government—was one of the five evils mankind must bear. Their way of life taught them to look to their leaders for direction and guidance. Thus, the village elders, the Buddhist clergy, and the few leaders with national reputations for exemplifying the Buddhist way of life, commanded and received their voluntary support. For these reasons, Nu also appealed to the masses and held their loyalty. In their minds, he was a good and religious man.

untainted by those who surrounded him. With his picture as his party's election symbol, the people gave him and his party their vote with little thought.

Democracy in Burma, during the period of independence, existed in name and form, but it never took root in the culture. When the coup occurred, the people did not oppose it; instead, they greeted the change with stoic silence.

THE MILITARY TAKE CONTROL

As military men, the coup leaders organized and executed their plot with speed and precision; as political leaders, they have run the government with less assurance. At the beginning, the coup leaders created a Revolutionary Council of 17 senior military officers with General Ne Win as Chairman; this Council was entrusted with all powers.

The Revolutionary Council consolidated its authority and eliminated all potential rival centers of power by arresting the leaders of the minority secessionist movement and reorganizing the state governments so that they were subject to greater controls. It attacked the problems of law and order by creating a hierarchy of Security and Administration Councils (S.A.C.) composed of representatives from the army, civil service, and police, giving them sufficient power to restore order and to carry out other assigned tasks. It eliminated its remaining political rivals by dissolving parliament, replacing the Supreme and High Courts with a new final court and discontinuing all ministries, boards and advisory councils for which it had no immediate need. It also strengthened the position of the army by disbanding its rival, the Union Constabulary. By the end of April, 1962, the Revolutionary Council had completed most of the above changes and was unchallenged in its control of power.

The coup leaders moved with less assurance in approaching the problem of winning popular support. They permitted the newspapers to publish with relative freedom so long as they made no effort to undermine the dictatorship. The government was conciliatory toward the political parties. It even sought

the support of their leaders for a new national party which would combine all existing parties and would give support to the coup government. The Revolutionary Council published a treatise, *Burmese Way to Socialism*, which was to be the philosophy of the new party and the ruling oligarchs.

Only the A.F.P.F.L. leaders rejected outright the proposed one party system because it meant the end of responsible legal opposition. The A.F.P.F.L. leaders also denied that parliamentary democracy was unsuited to Burma and the cause of many of its problems. The leaders of the other parties were mixed in their reactions to the one party idea; only the leaders of the extreme left-wing splinter groups were in favor, as they saw the proposed party as a way to capture or, at least, influence power.

The idea of a single party, with all political leaders united, was unrealistic because the politicians were hopelessly divided after 16 years of competition. By the end of the summer, the ruling oligarchy realized the ineffectiveness of its plan to use existing party leaders to build a new organization; they abandoned the plan and decided to build a new organization of their own and to draw their initial recruits from the military. From that time, their relations with the parties deteriorated.

The Revolutionary Council was unsuccessful, and possibly uninterested, in winning the backing and cooperation of the intelligentsia and the civilian élite. During its first five months in office, it publicly denounced the university faculties, the medical profession, the public school teachers and the government employees for corruption, incompetence, self-interest, waste and other evils. These, the coup leaders said, contributed directly to the political-social deterioration of Burma. The tactic won some support for the military leaders among the peasants and laborers who resented the slights and abuses they had suffered from bureaucrats and other government officials.

In July, the Revolutionary Council met the challenge of a university student strike, over newly instituted regulations, with gun-

fire and other repressive measures. The brutality, and senseless killing of the students, frightened the population and lost support for the government from many who had previously applauded its actions. By the end of their first year in office, the military rulers had succeeded in alienating the educated classes and thereby depriving themselves of the skills and cooperation of the very people who were necessary to any program of reform and modernization.

The long-run goal of the coup leaders, according to their treatise, was to convert Burma into a "socialist society of affluence." During their first ten months in office they did little to alter either the existing economy or the pattern of society. They concentrated their efforts upon improving state enterprises, meeting the government's rice delivery commitments and helping the consumer by exerting pressure on the business community to hold down prices and to keep their goods from entering the black market.

Indigenous private enterprise was acknowledged to have a creative role during the transitional period preceding socialism. Brigadier Aung Gyi, as spokesman for the Revolutionary Council, said that the business community could look ahead for at least two years before its activities might be curtailed. By the end of the year, the government began to eliminate foreign firms and joint ventures—partnerships between the government and foreign private firms.

In February, 1963, the direction and the timetable of the coup leaders altered abruptly. Following a split in the Revolutionary Council, which brought the resignation of Brigadier Aung Gyi, the government ordered the seizure of all banks, both foreign and domestic. Shortly thereafter, General Ne Win announced that the government planned immediately to eliminate the private sector of the economy and to move rapidly toward socialism. Private trading in grains was halted and other measures followed in the same pattern. By these moves, the government lost the support of another element of the civilian élite, the business community.

In line with its new policies, the Revolu-

tionary Council sought to win and hold the support of the peasants and laborers. It exalted them in public celebrations on Independence and Resistance Days; it flattered them by sending its own members to the fields and factories to be photographed with them in poses designed to show the military's interest and partnership in their activities; it specifically aided the peasants by promulgating three measures which increased crop loans and agriculture labor credit and guaranteed that land could not be taken for failure to pay off debts.

In June, 1963, the military dictators inaugurated a bold and dangerous plan to end insurgency and rebellion and win the support of the underground forces; they offered to negotiate without first requiring that the rebels lay down their arms and return peacefully to society. The offer went even further and guaranteed safe passage to and from the negotiations.

This new policy toward the rebels was an abrupt break with the past; formerly, all governments—civil and military—had insisted that the rebels surrender their arms and return to society before any such discussions could take place. Many in Burma believed that the army, having spent most of its professional life fighting the insurgents, would never negotiate while the rebels held their arms and position; it was also said that the military had organized the original coup partly out of fear that U Nu might be planning this type of negotiation. During the summer and fall the new policy brought many Communists back to society and permitted

(Continued on page 116)

Josef Silverstein earned his Ph.D. at Cornell University. He has visited Burma twice; in 1955-1956 as a Ford Fellow and Fulbright pre-doctoral candidate, and in 1961-1962 as a Fulbright Senior Lecturer at Mandalay University. He is presently completing his revision of the Burma section of *Government and Politics in Southeast Asia*, edited by George McTurnan Kahin, and is writing a full-length study on the politics of national unity in Burma.

The new Federation of Malaysia offers both advantages and disadvantages in Southeast Asia. Indonesian hostility and the questionable loyalty of the Chinese minorities are "sufficiently grave considerations to make an optimistic prognosis for Malaysia unwarranted."

The Formation of Malaysia

By C. PAUL BRADLEY

*Associate Professor of Political Science,
University of Michigan Flint College*

NOT SINCE the advent of the Congo Republic has the birth of a new state been so troubled as that of Malaysia on September 16, 1963. External opposition in the form of Indonesia's "confrontation" policy was a formidable obstacle. Formally enunciated by Foreign Minister Subandrio in January, 1963, the Indonesian thesis argued that the formation of Malaysia represented "neo-colonialism" and "neo-imperialism" serving to perpetuate British strategic interests in Southeast Asia and, therefore, was to be resisted.

Malaysia was originally proposed by Tunku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, in May, 1961. Alarmed by increased leftist strength in Singapore and the prospect of an independent pro-Communist state at the very door of the Federation, the Tunku suggested that the long debated merger of Singapore with the Federation be amplified to include the Bornean territories of Sarawak and North Borneo, both Crown Colonies, and the British protectorate of Brunei. Such an enlarged entity would pre-

vent the three and a half million Federation Malays from being numerically swamped by the nearly one million and a half Singapore Chinese added to the two and a half million Federation Chinese.¹ It was further assumed that a strong central government, safely in the hands of the Tunku's anti-Communist Alliance party, would be capable of controlling future internal subversion in Singapore.

Preoccupied with the West Irian question, Indonesia had originally indicated that she would not actively oppose the formation of Malaysia. The powerful Indonesian Communist party first asserted the neo-colonialist thesis in December, 1961. Later, it was adopted by the Sukarno government as well as by Moscow and Peking. By September, 1962, Dr. Subandrio, presumably apprehensive of a possible Anglo-American military build-up in Malaysia, warned that any American base in North Borneo would be matched by arrangements for a Soviet base in Indonesian Borneo. Thus, a secondary theme of "encirclement by Western imperialism" was sounded. In December, President Sukarno hailed the Brunei revolt, led by the pro-Indonesian nationalist A. M. Azahari, as an ideal model of historically ascendant "emergent forces" and denounced the Tunku for aiding the embattled Brunei Sultan. Simultaneously, he disavowed Indonesian territorial ambitions in North Borneo.

¹ In Malaysia, the Chinese constitute slightly over 42 per cent of the total population, the Malays about 40 per cent. The ethnic balance is held by the Indians, with about nine per cent of the population, and the diverse indigenous Bornean populations with the remaining. In Sarawak, the Sea Dayaks are numerically the most important indigenous grouping, the Dusuns in North Borneo; each of these constitutes nearly a third of their state's total population.

Meanwhile, in June, 1962, the Philippines reactivated a long dormant claim to a section of North Borneo originally held by the Sultan of Sulu, to whose heirs Britain made annual payments. The crux of the British-Filipino dispute lay in their conflicting interpretations of the Sultan's 1878 agreement with two representatives of a British trading company. To the Philippines this was merely a lease which did not involve a transfer of sovereignty to the British. In the British view, the agreement constituted a permanent cession to the forerunner of the British North Borneo Company which the British government had absorbed in 1946.

Several plausible motives for the Philippine action were advanced: 1) pressure was being exerted against Britain for a favorable financial settlement on the claim before the advent of Malaysia; 2) the proposed new state would be too weak to withstand Communist expansion or infiltration in an area dangerously close to Filipino territory and required advance intervention by Manila; and 3) Filipino opposition to Malaysia was but one facet in a recent foreign policy re-orientation which sought a closer identification with Asian anti-colonialist forces and a loosening of traditional ties with the United States. In subsequent months, the Philippines played a dual role: echoing Indonesian opposition to Malaysia in less strident tones and, at the same time, acting in the name of Malay unity to avert an open rupture between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur.

INDONESIAN HOSTILITY

In the early months of 1963, the vituperative exchanges between Indonesia and Malaya assumed greater intensity, culminating in a military build-up by both states. Suddenly, in May, President Sukarno invited the Tunku to confer with him in Tokyo and conversations were held in a surprisingly cordial atmosphere. Thus, the path was cleared for the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaya and

the Philippines to meet in Manila in June. This, in turn, indicated a later "summit" meeting by the three heads of government.

The foreign ministers made considerable progress during this June meeting. Indonesia and the Philippines promised to "welcome" the formation of Malaysia if the support of the Bornean peoples were affirmed by an "independent and impartial authority," namely, the Secretary-General of the United Nations.² The precise nature and timing of the United Nations "ascertainment" of public opinion in North Borneo and Sarawak were left undefined. The Philippines reiterated a pledge to pursue its North Borneo claim solely by "peaceful means," with Indonesia and Malaya affirming that the inclusion of North Borneo in Malaysia, on the anticipated inaugural date of August 31, would not prejudice an eventual settlement of the Filipino claim.

In endorsing Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal's cherished plan for closer union of the three nations of Malay origin, the Conference assumed an even more ambitious ultimate aim. This was a new grouping, christened Maphilindo, and was envisioned as a first step toward confederation of their 140 million peoples. National secretariats were to be established in each of the three capitals to provide rudimentary consultative machinery. Regular meetings of the heads of government and their foreign ministers would be convened at least once a year. The three states thus boldly asserted their "primary responsibility" for maintaining regional security against subversion in "any form or manifestation." This declaration cloaked a divergency between Indonesian preoccupation with eliminating Western influence in Southeast Asia and the sharper anti-Communist emphasis of Malaya and the Philippines, an element strongly interwoven with their fear of Chinese expansion.

BRITAIN AND MALAYSIA

The reduction in regional tensions that followed the Manila agreement was momentary. In July, representatives from the future component units of Malaysia met in London

² See final communiqué, Manila Foreign Ministers' Conference, June 11, 1963. Federation of Malaya Information Service, U.S. Embassy, Washington, D.C., Backgrounder #A32, p. 5.

and signed an agreement which provided for the transfer of British sovereignty over Singapore, Sarawak, and North Borneo to Malaysia.³ The 1957 defense treaty between Britain and Malaya was extended to Malaysia. Britain's continued control of her Singapore bases was affirmed for the three purposes of assisting in the defense of Malaysia, defending the Commonwealth and, more ambiguously, preserving the peace of Southeast Asia.

Although Malaysia would not be a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, the degree to which the new state might become involved in the future implementation of Britain's Seato commitments remained obscure. A draft Malaysia Act stipulated a detailed amendment of the existing Federation Constitution which would establish the legal basis for the new state. Indonesian President Sukarno quickly attacked the London Agreement as a breach of faith by the Tunku since it presumed the finality of Malaysia's formation prior to a United Nations plebiscite in Borneo. This misunderstanding augured ill for the pending "summit" conference in Manila.

Following a week of difficult negotiations, Sukarno, Abdul Rahman and Macapagal reached a seemingly decisive agreement on the formation of Malaysia August 5. It represented a considerable diplomatic triumph for Sukarno and required important concessions by Abdul Rahman. Prior to the formation of Malaysia, United Nations working teams were to employ a "fresh approach" in ascertaining if the recent elections in Sarawak and North Borneo in effect sanctioned Bornean participation in Malaysia. They were to be accompanied by Malayan, Indonesian and Filipino observers. The Tunku not only agreed to a possible postponement of Malaysia Day until after August 31 but risked a possibly negative report by United Nations

³ See *Malaysia: Agreement concluded between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Federation of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore*, HMSO, Cmnd. 2094, July 1963, pp. 1-3. The Sultan of Brunei, unwilling to share equal status with the nine Federation Sultans, decided against joining the new state.

⁴ See *Backgrounder #A32, op. cit.*, p. 10.

representatives. Doubtless the Indonesian as well as the Filipino observers would prove to be extremely critical of a pro-Malaysia report by the United Nations Mission and might then reject its findings altogether. The Tunku, confident of a favorable United Nations report, justified his concessions by asserting that they would encourage ultimate Indonesian and Filipino acceptance of Malaysia.

Simultaneously, the newly conceived Maphilindo was given a neutralist cast. Henceforth, foreign bases, as in the Philippines and Malaya, were not to be used "directly or indirectly" to subvert the national independence of the member states and would, in any case, be "temporary" in nature.⁴ In the future, the Manila powers were to avoid participating in collective defense arrangements that served the interests of unspecified Great Powers. This declaration, if fully implemented, foreshadowed Indonesian regional domination and a decline in Western influence. It portended an important shift in the strongly pro-Western policy followed by Malaya since 1957 and the Philippines' hitherto vigorous support of Seato. But continued friction over Malaysia indefinitely deferred a further evolution of Maphilindo.

A dispute over the numbers and status of Indonesian and Filipino observers for the United Nations teams quickly undermined the Manila accord. Britain denied visa applications for a large Indonesian team to observe the nine-man United Nations Mission. To counteract this impasse, U Thant proposed the use of a quota of four observers and four clerical assistants for each of the participating states. This then brought a British complaint that Indonesia and the Philippines were actually sending senior officials in the guise of "junior" assistants. Finally, Britain approved new observer lists when satisfied that those involved were not members of their countries' intelligence services.

While British and Malayan observers were present from the outset, Indonesian and Filipino observers missed nearly a week of the United Nations Borneo hearings, being present for only three and a half days. Further

frictions were aroused when Malaya unilaterally set September 16 as Malaysia Day and announced that the new state would be proclaimed on that date regardless of the final report of the United Nations Mission.

REPORT ON THE ELECTIONS

On September 14, Secretary General U Thant endorsed the final report of the Malaysia Mission which found a clear majority of Borneo opinion in favor of Malaysia. Its principal finding held that the recent series of elections for the legislative bodies at various governmental levels in both North Borneo and Sarawak had been fairly and freely conducted; that Malaysia had been widely debated in the preceding campaigns and constituted the major issue in most electoral districts.⁵

In Sarawak, the strongly pro-Malaysia Alliance party had won the largest single block of elective seats in 24 District Councils, 138 out of a total of 429 seats. Of the 116 elected Independents, the Mission classified 87 as pro-Malaysia. The considerable strength of the anti-Malaysia, and predominantly Chinese, Sarawak United People's party was concentrated in the urban centers where it had won most of its 116 seats. The total anti-Malaysia sentiment in Sarawak was estimated to represent about 25 per cent of the electorate.

In North Borneo, organized opposition to Malaysia was scarcely discernible. There,

⁵ See United Nations Malaysia Mission, *Report to the Secretary-General*, Document 63-19342, Findings, pp. 90-8.

⁶ In both Sarawak and North Borneo the Alliance parties were loose electoral combinations whose constituent parts typically voiced the political aspirations of a single ethnic group. In April, 1963, both the Sarawak and Sabah Alliance groupings had sent delegates to a Grand Alliance conference in Kuala Lumpur which the Federation's Alliance party had easily dominated. Their shared support of Malaysia was the principal unifying element for the units comprising the Grand Alliance. Delegates from similar Alliance groupings in Brunei and Singapore had also been present.

⁷ See Memorandum of the Indonesian Delegation on the Report of the U.N. Malaysian Mission, New York, September 13, 1963. Also, "Report of the Philippine Observer Teams in Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo)," Washington, D.C., September 19, 1963.

the local Alliance party,⁶ supporting Malaysia, had dominated the elections, winning all but 6 of 137 seats in the local councils. Slight evidence of dissident opinion by some members of the Pasok Momogun party, one of the five affiliated parties in the Alliance, was noted. Some of its members reportedly favored self-government for Sabah (North Borneo) before considering adherence to Malaysia.

The Mission also concluded that the election results had not been significantly affected by the non-participation of certain anti-Malaysia political leaders detained under Preservation of Public Security statutes for political offenses. These had numbered 109 in Sarawak, and fewer in North Borneo. A similar finding was applied to the "few hundred" persons absent from the two territories during the elections due to "possible political or other intimidation."

The Indonesian and Filipino observer teams rendered negative reports on the Mission's findings.⁷ In their view, the ten days of Bornean hearings had been too brief to constitute a "fresh approach" to Bornean opinion on Malaysia. They felt that the Mission had been excessively dependent on British colonial officials in the two territories in making necessary physical arrangements and had been given a virtual "guided tour" with a subtly pro-Malaysian emphasis. Further, they thought that a disproportionate high percentage of persons appearing at the scheduled hearings were elected officials who were mostly supporters of Malaysia, and that the whole election procedure had not been scrutinized with sufficient care.

Greatly intensified regional tensions immediately followed the formal proclamation of Malaysia on September 16, 1963. Indonesia and the Philippines denied the new state diplomatic recognition. Indonesia severed trade relations with Malaysia. Indonesia's negative reaction to the report of the United Nations Malaysia Mission was employed to justify resumption of a confrontation policy. In an inflammatory speech at Jogjakarta on September 25, President Sukarno charged that certain of the Bornean hearings had been


held "under the guard of bayonets." Malaysian neo-colonialism was once again said to be an attempt to "corner" Indonesia—compelling his nation to "fight and destroy" Malaysia. In the West, this defensive line was increasingly interpreted as a cover for Indonesia's own expansionist aims.

The brunt of Indonesian hostility was levied against the alleged creator of Malaysia. The British embassy in Jakarta was sacked. British business concerns, including the Shell Oil Company, whose total estimated value was \$450 million, were placed under the control of Indonesian government departments. The Government denied its action presaged nationalization of these businesses but, rather, constituted "protective supervision" to fore-stall their seizure by labor unions under the influence of the Indonesian Communist party. Based on their experience during the Indonesian seizure of Dutch enterprises in 1957, the Government may intend to put off possible later British claims for compensation by refusing to equate its taking over of British businesses with nationalization.

Typically the Philippines adopted a milder policy. Like Indonesia, they demanded "corrections" in the United Nations Report. But, at the United Nations, the new Philippine Foreign Minister, Dr. Salvador Lopez, advised a cooling-off period of "a month or two" to reduce the then heightened tensions and reacted favorably to a possible mediation of the Malaysian dispute under the auspices of Thailand. Japan also indicated a willingness to assume the role of mediator.

The repercussions of the new stringency in Indonesian confrontation were registered in a widening arc. In Malaysia itself, there ensued a marked preoccupation with "preparedness" measures. Prime Minister Abdul Rahman became chairman of a newly created Defense Council assisted by key cabinet ministers and chiefs of the armed forces. Army reserves were to be called up to increase by five per cent Malaysia's small force of about 15,000 soldiers. The Special Constabulary, a paramilitary police force, was to be revived.

At the regional level the consultative machinery to be created for Maphilindo was in



The Federation of Malaysia

abeyance. The rupture in Malayan-Filipino relations was also a setback to the Association of Southeast Asia, formed by the two states in 1961 in cooperation with Thailand. A.S.A. had been designed to increase economic and cultural exchanges between the three member states and ultimately to lead to creation of a free trade area. Indonesia had declined to join this grouping which Dr. Subandrio had called "something unreal."

Although the future existence of Malaysia was still precarious, a full-scale military attack against the two Borneo states, mounted from Indonesian Borneo, remained an unlikely option. This would precipitate armed intervention by Britain aided by Australia. Indonesia, it was felt, was more likely to accelerate its guerrilla program of harassing border raids, particularly against Sarawak, which would require an excessively high level of defense expenditure by Malaysia. On September 2, General Abdul Haris Nasution, the Indonesian Defense Minister and Army Chief of Staff, acknowledged that Indonesia had already helped train more than 6,000 anti-Malaysia rebels in the northern Borneo states.

While the Kennedy Administration endorsed Malaysia as a valuable contribution to regional stability, the United States deferred to Britain as the principal Western protagonist for the new state. The United States played a secondary role in the post-Malaysia Day crisis. It attempted to check Indonesian aggressiveness by announcing a temporary

withdrawal of new foreign aid programs for Indonesia. A degree of Anglo-American collaboration was anticipated in the eventuality of military aggression against Malaysia.

Both the Soviet Union and Communist China have consistently opposed Malaysia and upheld Indonesian confrontation. Their rivalry for leadership of the anti-colonialist states was reflected in the quick succession of visits to Jakarta by Marshal Malinovsky, the Russian minister of defense, and the Chinese head of state, Liu Shao-chi, in March and April, 1963. The latter was particularly vehement in publicly denouncing Malaysia. In a post-Malaysia Day interview with a Western journalist, Premier Chou En-lai reiterated support for Indonesian opposition to Malaysia, calling it a "just cause."⁸

The situation was still uncertain. Malaysia had been formed "with no clear expression of the independent will of the people," said Chou, and its claim as an independent state was further beclouded by British and American support. Part of the striking Indonesian military advantage over Malaysia was obviously attributable to sizable amounts of recent Soviet military aid. Future Communist Chinese support for the Indonesian position would probably continue to be expressed chiefly in propagandistic form.

The internal domination of Malaysia by its numerically largest component has never been in doubt. Malaya alone comprises approximately 71 per cent of the ten million population. The internal position of Malaya's governing Alliance party was sufficiently strong virtually to insure its capacity to control the first Malaysian Parliament. This was reinforced by the 1963 electoral victories of its allies in Sarawak and Sabah. So pre-eminent was the prestige of the Malayan Alliance party leader that no potential prime

⁸ Interview by Gerald Long, general manager of Reuters, *The New York Times*, October 14, 1963, p. 5.

⁹ In July, 1963, a special mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development under the chairmanship of Jacques Rueff recommended that Malaysia adopt a common market arrangement. See their *Report on the Economic Aspects of Malaysia*, Washington, D.C., July, 1963, pp. 12-16.

minister other than Abdul Rahman was mentioned. Thus, prior to Malaysia Day, it was politically feasible to propose an amended Malayan Constitution as the constitutional instrument for Malaysia. Yet substantial concessions to both Singapore and the Bornean territories were required to win their adherence and ease their admission to the new state.

Singapore's claim for a special status within the new Federation was aggressively advanced by its Prime Minister, Lee Kuan-yew, leader of the People's Action party. As early as August, 1961, the Tunku had agreed with Mr. Lee that Singapore would be granted autonomy in labor and education. If controlled by the Central Malaysian government, dominated by a conservative Alliance, these two spheres of policy could have become chronic sources of friction between Kuala Lumpur and the politically more radical Chinese electorate in Singapore. To balance this concession, however, Singapore was allocated only 15 of the 159 seats in the Federal House of Representatives. Furthermore, Singapore citizens were to exercise their voting privileges in Malaysia only in Singapore constituencies unless they could qualify elsewhere.

A highly acrimonious dispute between Singapore and the Federation subsequently erupted over the precise nature of the former's financial contribution to the central government of the new state. This was finally settled with the British looking on at the London Conference in July, 1963. Part of Lee's stubbornness had been motivated by his obvious desire to improve his prospects in Singapore's pending general election. At the last minute, he agreed that two-fifths of Singapore's tax revenue would go to the central government. The Malayans, in turn, agreed that provision for a Malaysian common market would be incorporated in the Malaysian constitution.⁹ The Singaporeans

(Continued on page 115)

C. Paul Bradley spent three months in Malaya and Singapore in the spring of 1963. He has written several articles on political party systems in such diverse places as Jamaica, British Guiana, and Singapore.

As this observer evaluates the situation, Indonesia is following "what it calls 'an independent and active' foreign policy." Although Sukarno is avowedly neutral, his "strong anti-capitalist sentiments and the support which Russia gave Indonesia in its struggle for control of West Irian are undoubtedly factors which tend to incline his neutralism in favor of the Communist bloc."

Power Balance in Indonesia

By AMRY VANDENBOSCH

*Director, Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce,
University of Kentucky*

PRESIDENT SUKARNO remains the strongest political force in Indonesia.¹ His hypnotic power over the masses does not seem to have diminished. His success in getting the Dutch out of West Irian and bringing that coveted territory under Indonesian control has certainly not lessened his prestige. The Provisional Peoples Congress, whose members were appointed by Sukarno himself in 1960, elected him president for life in May, 1963. He declared then that he accepted the life presidency to enable him "to give leadership to the revolutionary struggle of the people of Indonesia." After the death of First Minister Djuanda Kartawidjojo in November, 1963, President Sukarno restored the position of prime minister (which had been abolished in 1959) and named himself to that position as well.

Two other powerful political factors in Indonesia are the army and the Communist party, each hostile to the other. So long as Sukarno can balance these two forces his position is safe. The pressure of the Communists on Sukarno is strong and steady. Sukarno thus far has been able to resist, but the Party is strong. It claims a membership of two million and a front group four times as large. It is said to be the largest Communist

party in the world outside of the Communist countries. The very poor economic conditions in Indonesia favor its growth and increase its power, even though, on the other hand, the clash between Peking and Moscow places the Party in a difficult position.

The position of the army was enhanced after the rebellion against the central government in 1958 and the "confrontation" with the Dutch in the West Irian dispute. But, when these critical situations had passed, there was widespread popular demand, not resisted by Sukarno, that the size of the army be reduced. General Nasution and army leaders then countered this pressure by announcing that the army would be put to work to build roads and bridges, irrigation ditches and other public works. This "civic action" program incidentally, and probably also intentionally, led to firmer army control over local governmental functions. The Malaysian "confrontation" at the end of 1963 again strengthened the position of the army.

In contrast with Sukarno's success in putting down the rebellion and acquiring control over West Irian stands the steady deterioration of economic conditions at home. In 1940, Indonesia was the world's third largest producer of sugar; in 1962, it had to import this commodity. In 1940, Indonesia was an important exporter of rubber, tin,

¹ For a survey and analysis of political developments in Indonesia through 1960, see my article, "Guided Democracy" in Indonesia" in this journal, December, 1961.

petroleum and coconut products. Production and exports of all these commodities except petroleum have declined, in some cases drastically. Only petroleum production has increased, probably due to the fact that this industry is still operated by foreign companies.

Budget deficits have mounted; in 1961, the deficit shot up to 26,303 million rupiahs and the internal debt to 68,053 million rupiahs. The amount of money in circulation increased from 7.49 billion rupiahs in 1953 to 142.89 billion in February, 1962. Steep inflation has been the inevitable accompaniment of the fiscal policies, or the lack of them. Because of late rains, a considerably reduced rice crop was expected in 1963, making the problem of price control even more difficult. During August and September, the price of rice doubled.

At long last the Indonesian government seemed ready to make a serious effort to control inflation and to spur the economy. For assistance, it turned to the International Monetary Fund and the United States Agency for International Development. The agencies' recommended plan of financial and other governmental measures included an extension of \$350 million in foreign credits to balance the budget and halt the decline in the value of the rupiah. The reforms announced on May 27, 1963, seemed effective. The rupiah, which in May had declined to about 1300 to the United States dollar on the black market, went up to 900 in June. Many other measures will still have to be taken to stabilize the rupiah and spur the economy. Foreign credits will be needed over a long period. Corruption will have to be controlled and inefficiency overcome. The "confrontation" with Malaysia, involving increased military expenditures and an embargo on trade with that country, will make the job even more difficult.

SUKARNO'S TRIUMPH OVER THE DUTCH

The Dutch have paid heavily for their decision to hold on to West New Guinea when they granted Indonesia independence in 1949. Whatever chance there was for good relations

between the two countries after Indonesian independence was lost by Dutch determination to retain this large but poor remnant of their former large colonial empire in Asia. They lost much trade, sacrificed investments of over a billion dollars and for more than a decade subsidized the administration of West New Guinea to the amount of \$20 million or more annually.

In this bitter contest between Indonesia and the Netherlands the former held nearly all of the trump cards. With independence, Indonesia had assumed a considerable debt to the Netherlands; the Netherlands-Indonesian Union for "organized cooperation" between the two countries was formed; there were many thousands of Dutchmen who had made Indonesia their home; the Dutch had large investments in Indonesia; and finally, the disputed West Irian territory bordered Indonesia and was a long distance from the Netherlands. These factors were in the nature of hostages held by Indonesia, and Sukarno made use of all of them in his struggle with the Dutch. In addition, post-war anti-colonial sentiment was in Indonesia's favor, though it is not clear that West Irian is any less a colony today than it was under the Dutch.

Indonesia continued to demand the unconditional transfer of sovereignty over the territory; it was prepared to negotiate only the manner of the transfer. When the Netherlands rejected this demand, Indonesia applied steadily mounting pressure on the Dutch. In 1953, the Indonesian government requested the withdrawal of the Dutch military mission which was in Indonesia to help train its army; in 1956, the Union was abrogated and the debt to the Netherlands was repudiated; and in the closing months of 1957 a bitterly anti-Dutch campaign was launched. K.L.M. planes were forbidden to land in Djakarta. Strikes were called in Dutch-owned business enterprises and the Dutch-owned fleet of vessels engaged in inter-island shipping was taken over by the Indonesian government and, although later restored, was prohibited from engaging in its accustomed traffic. Under severe pressure,

Netherlands in droves left Indonesia and returned to Holland. In 1960, diplomatic relations were broken off between the two countries.

In the last phase of the struggle for the "liberation" of West Irian, Indonesia resorted to military infiltration, raids and the threat of military action to wrest control from the Netherlands. It obtained large amounts of military equipment from Russia. Total mobilization of the military forces of the country was ordered by President Sukarno on December 19, 1961.

Stirred by the danger of military conflict, U Thant, the then Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, appealed to the two governments to discuss with him "the possibilities of a peaceful settlement of the whole question in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." The Dutch government had taken the position that the estimated 700,000 inhabitants of West Irian should be given the right of self-determination, a right guaranteed peoples of non-self-governing territories in the Charter of the United Nations. Replying to U Thant, The Hague declared that it was willing to negotiate with Indonesia under the Secretary-General's auspices "without preconditions." A few days later, President Sukarno also yielded to Thant's appeal.

Actual negotiations did not begin until March 20, 1962. Secret meetings were held in Washington with Ellsworth Bunker, a retired United States ambassador, as the mediator. Indonesia, at one point, suspended negotiations for a period of about two months, during which time it stepped up military threats. A compromise proposal by Ambassador Bunker became the basis for the final settlement. On August 15, 1962, Indonesia accepted a provision for a plebiscite to determine whether the territory would remain with Indonesia or be independent; the referendum would not be held until Indonesia acquired control over the territory but before the end of 1969. The agreement called for the transfer of the administration of West Irian to a United Nations Temporary Executive Authority, which in turn was

to transfer it to Indonesia. The United Nations took over the administration on October 1, 1962, and on May, 1, 1963, Indonesia obtained full control over the territory it had struggled so long to acquire. It is not likely that Indonesia will lose a popular referendum on self-determination conducted after several years of Indonesian administration in West Irian.

The Dutch can still be of great help to Indonesia, if the latter seriously wishes to improve its economy. There are still many Netherlands with profound knowledge of Indonesia and with wide experience there. Dutch libraries and universities have rich deposits of materials on all phases of Indonesian life. Relations between the two countries have improved, but much will have to be forgotten on both sides before cordial relations can be expected. The economic position the Dutch held in Indonesia before 1957 can never be recovered. Moreover, there remains the thorny question of compensation for the billion dollars of Dutch property which in effect was confiscated by Indonesia.

FOREIGN POLICY

Indonesia follows what it calls "an independent and active" foreign policy. This is a policy to which the term "neutralism" has been generally applied in postwar years. Indonesia certainly is not committed to isolation from world affairs, but merely refuses to commit itself to either of the two major power blocs in advance. Undoubtedly, there are positive factors in Indonesian foreign policy; for one, Indonesia prefers an active role in Asia and in world politics. Surely, as the world's fifth most populous country, it must feel entitled to be heard in the councils of the world.

Among the non-aligned states it is clearly a major power. That it has such ambitions was indicated by its sponsorship of the Asian-African Conference in 1955. It also regards itself as a champion of peoples under colonial rule. However, Sukarno's strong anti-capitalist sentiments and the support which Russia gave Indonesia in its struggle for control of West Irian are undoubtedly factors

which tend to incline his neutralism in favor of the Communist bloc.

Djakarta was among the first to recognize the Chinese Communist regime and has consistently supported its claim to China's seat in the organs of the United Nations. But the treatment of Chinese in Indonesia is less friendly; there is much hostile feeling and there are frequent riots against them. On November 10, 1959, the Indonesian government issued a regulation prohibiting aliens from engaging in retail trade in rural areas. This was directed against the Chinese, who have long dominated this field. Peking protested this measure as anti-Chinese and discriminatory, without effect. When members of the Chinese embassy and consular staff advised the Chinese not to obey the regulation, the Indonesian government protested to Peking, restricted the movement of Chinese diplomatic and consular agents and demanded the recall of several of them. Peking responded by inviting the Chinese in Indonesia to return to China with transportation provided. About 100,000 were repatriated.

Liu Shao-Chi, president of Communist China, visited Indonesia in April, 1963. There is speculation as to whether he applied too much pressure on Sukarno either with respect to the local treatment of Chinese or with respect to support for Peking in its controversy with Moscow. In any case, immediately after this visit Sukarno began vigorously to promote cooperation with Malaya and the Philippines for "the maintenance of the stability and security of the area from subversion in any form."

INDONESIAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONS

The United States has played an important role in Indonesian foreign policy. It was helpful both in the United Nations and outside of it in bringing about an independence agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands. It was also influential in bringing about a settlement in the West Irian dispute. Indonesian nationalist leaders, however, are still resentful toward the United States for economic and military aid to the Netherlands during the years of their struggle

with the Dutch for independence. This aid, they believe, enabled the Dutch to mount their "police actions" in Indonesia.

Furthermore, Sukarno seems convinced that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles hoped that the rebels would succeed in 1958; some of Dulles' statements in the early months of the rebellion were interpreted to give the dissidents moral support. It is also believed by Indonesians that the United States was involved in getting military equipment to the rebels; a few American "soldiers of fortune" did fly bombing planes for the rebels. Later, the United States government took a firm position that the rebellion in Indonesia was an internal matter. It sold arms to the Sukarno government, but not nearly so many as Sukarno requested. Washington probably feared that a large supply of arms might later be used against the Dutch in West Irian.

The United States has provided Indonesia with \$710 million in loans, grants and surplus food and, since 1959, about \$20 million a year in military equipment. Indonesia is now desperately in need of foreign credit to stabilize and spur its economy. American economists have recommended foreign credits of \$350 million over a period of five years, with \$90 million as the United States' contribution. At first the United States government was prepared to join in this program, but after Indonesian opposition to Malaysia developed in the fall of 1963, it withdrew its offer. Strong opposition to further economic and military aid to Indonesia had already developed in Congress. The future foreign policy of Indonesia toward the United States and others may well be strongly influenced by the aid or refusal of aid Indonesia receives from the rival power blocs.

RUSSIA BEARING GIFTS

In rivalry with the United States and other major powers of the West, the Soviet Union has had great advantages. It has been ideologically opposed to imperialism, at least the Western variety. It has given Indonesia complete support in the United Nations on the question of Indonesian independence. When the United States refused to send Indonesia



Reprinted courtesy of the U.S. Department of State

all the arms it requested for its military display against the Dutch, Russia gladly agreed to sell Indonesia large amounts of modern equipment. On the other hand, the Soviet Union may have instigated the Communist revolt in Java at a dark moment in the Indonesian struggle for independence. Many Indonesians think so.

Indonesia is now deeply in debt to Russia. In addition to over \$800 million in military supplies, it owes Russia about \$400 million for economic aid.

The large and well-disciplined Communist party has also given an advantage to Russia in her relations with Indonesia. In the last months, however, Indonesian Communist leaders have sided more and more with China in its controversy with Russia.

Policy toward Indonesia is Australia's most important foreign relations problem. Indonesia is its nearest neighbor and has a population about ten times that of Australia. Indonesia is no longer a dependency of a small, friendly European state, but independent and ambitious. It now controls the western half of New Guinea; Papua, the eastern half, is under Australian administration. When Australians recall that Japanese occupation of this territory exposed their country to the threat of hostile invasion in World War II, they may well be apprehensive. Will Indonesia some day start a campaign

against Australia to "liberate" Papua?

Australia naturally desires friendly relations with its neighbor. It has trained a large number of Indonesians and given other aid. But Australia is committed to the security of Malaysia; Indonesian pressure against Malaysia will cause serious strains.

Recent events in Southeast Asia have caused great uneasiness in Australia and New Zealand. Because of its concern for the security of Papua, the Australian government will greatly expand its defense program in the next five years. W. Averell Harriman, American Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, stopped in Australia in June, 1963, on his way to New Zealand for a meeting of the Anzus Council. At that time he declared that, while there was no indication that Indonesia had designs on Papua, if trouble did arise, the three Anzus partners—Australia, New Zealand and the United States—would be "in it together." The communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Council meeting declared support for the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia and stated further that a threat to any of the members of the Anzus treaty would be equally a threat to the others.

Portugal still holds half of Timor, an island of the Indonesian archipelago nearest to Australia. If Indonesia, following the example set by India with respect to Goa, should

move against Portuguese Timor, Australians would be strongly provoked. But there would seem to be little that their government could do. If Australia were to protest, it would be held up to the world as a defender of colonialism.

Indonesian foreign policy seemed to move in a new direction in June, 1963, with the participation of Foreign Minister Subandrio in a ministerial conference at Manila for the exploration of ways to join forces against subversion. The other participants were Vice President Emanuel Pelaez of the Philippines and Tun Abdul Razak, Deputy Premier of Malaya. The source of their common fear was not publicly disclosed, but it was generally believed that it was Chinese expansion.

This preliminary step was confirmed by the heads of the three states at a conference in Manila in early August. The "Manila Declaration" established permanent consultative machinery. "Maphilindo" was the name chosen for the new association. The agreement envisaged cooperation in matters of economics and culture as well as security. Because Malaya had a defense agreement with Great Britain, and the Philippines had a similar agreement with the United States, some formula was required to meet the demands of Sukarno's neutralism. The three countries agreed that there would be no further extension of foreign military installations; they would "abstain from the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers." These statements led some observers to wonder whether Sukarno hoped ultimately to drive the United States and Britain from the region, and to make Indonesia the dominant military power in the area.

It is difficult to understand Sukarno's bitter attack on Malaysia in the fall of 1963, following almost immediately upon the formation of Maphilindo. The creation of the Federation of Malaysia had been under discussion for months. Its object was similar to the supposed objectives of the association which Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines set up in the first days of August. The government of Malaya felt it was necessary to en-

large the Federation of Malaya to include Singapore and the three British territories of North Borneo to prevent Communist China from picking them off one by one.

It is true that Malaya could exert a tremendous attraction over the peoples of Sumatra, Borneo, and the Celebes, especially if conditions in Indonesia do not improve. This constitutes a real problem for the central government at Djakarta. The peoples of Malaya and Indonesia are closely related. The newly-created Indonesian language is based on Malay; the original home of the inhabitants of the Malay peninsula was Sumatra. Sukarno has had a great deal of trouble with the people in the islands outside Java. Malaya has enjoyed political stability and prosperity, in sharp contrast to Indonesia.

Perhaps for this reason, Indonesia, supported by the Philippines, protested the formation of the Malaysian Federation. Sukarno attacked it as a creature of British neo-colonialism, charging its purpose was to encircle or "corner" Indonesia, and declared that Indonesia "must fight and destroy Malaysia." Mobs in Djakarta marched on the British and Malayan embassies and sacked and burned the former. After the riots, the Indonesian government took over all British companies in its territory, allegedly in the interest of safety and continued production. On September 21, trade relations with Malaysia were severed. Since about 27 per cent of Indonesia's exports normally go to Singapore and Malaya, this act seriously weakened the Indonesian economy, making matters even more difficult for Sukarno.

Amry Vandenbosch was a member of the Brookhaven Nuclear Scientists' mission to the Colombo Plan countries in 1956 and a member of the Secretariat at the San Francisco Conference in 1945. A long-time student of colonial policy and administration in Southeast Asia, his books include *The Dutch East Indies: Its Government, Problems and Politics*; *Southeast Asia among the Powers* (with Richard Butwell); and *Dutch Foreign Policy since 1815: A Study in Small Power Politics*.

The dark picture in South Vietnam brightened, according to this observer, with the fall of the Ngo dynasty. "After nine long years, Saigon rang with laughter as tens of thousands of Vietnamese rushed from their homes, to cheer and feed the victorious rebel troops, to dance in the streets. . . ."

Vietnam: Land Without Laughter

By THOMAS E. ENNIS

Professor of Asian History, West Virginia University

WESTERN OBSERVERS are concerned over the extension of Peking's influence in Asia and wonder how this threat can be met. In 1949, Communist armies gained control over China's mainland. Peking imposed drastic rules over the once autonomous province of Tibet in 1951. The new Communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam was created in 1954, after ejection of the French command. Peking replaced Moscow as the master of North Korea in 1961. The neutralist regime of Laos, set up in 1962, provides for eventual Communist supremacy. The crisis in South Vietnam in 1963 showed the possibility of a Communist victory.

After nine years of existence, the Republic of Vietnam was becoming more and more an autocracy in the hands of the Ngo family. At the head was President Ngo Dinh Diem, a "mandarin"—the term applied to the old-time civil servant of the Emperors of Annam who not only collected taxes but also settled village disputes. Good "mandarins" were the father and mother of the people and President Ngo Dinh Diem considered himself such a man. He was often called Diem ("burning jade") by the natives. His foes called his rule "Diemocracy," as they pointed to the adherence to the ancient "mandarin complex" that he foisted upon his country-

men.¹ Tran Van Chuong, ex-ambassador to the United States and father of Madame Nhu, characterized the President as a "devoted Roman Catholic with the mind of a medieval inquisitor. There is no possibility of ever winning the war under the present regime."

Much of the criticism of the Diem administration was directed against his younger brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, who resided in the palace and held the title of Political Adviser. Nhu led a semi-secret political organization, the *Can Lao*, through which he held the final decision on all important civil and military appointments. He was the creator of an official philosophy called "personalism," a mystical ideology stemming from French Catholic thought of the 1930's, described as "existentialist fascism." Nhu's wife, the petite fire-brand and member of the National Assembly, was Vietnam's "First Lady," who directed all the major women's organizations. She was the author of the Family Law which provided that divorces could be obtained only with the consent of the President. She was the most powerful member of the Ngo dynasty, partly owing to the fact that she was its only female member, and partly because of her adamant courage in times of crisis.

When religious sects brought Vietnam to the brink of civil war in 1955, Diem and his brother Nhu began to waver, but were bolstered by the firmness of Madame Nhu.

¹ For details of his life see Thomas E. Ennis, "Lights and Shadows on Vietnam," *Current History*, December, 1961, pp. 335-36.

In 1960, when paratroopers revolted and surrounded the palace demanding political reforms, the President and his brother were prepared to bargain with the rebels. Once again, the "Dragon Lady" opposed negotiations and the rebellion was quashed. As a result, Madame Nhu claimed all the credit for saving the day for her brother-in-law. Her father summed up her stormy career as "a very sad case of power madness." Other brothers maintaining the House of Ngo were Archbishop Ngo Dinh Thuc of Hue', Ngo Dinh Luyen, ambassador in London, and Ngo Dinh Canh, political boss of Central Vietnam, who had at his call the services of a private police force.

Political bickering ushered in the year 1963. A group of deputies in the National Assembly questioned some of the chief ministers. Nguyen Ton Hoan, Secretary-General of the Dai-Viet Nationalist Party, exiled in Paris, traveled to Washington and delivered a letter to President Kennedy in March, with the hope of convincing him that continued support of Diem was leading to a Communist take-over. In 1954, he had aided Diem in gaining power. In 1963, he headed an undercover opposition faction which numbered some 5,000.

Discontent mounted rapidly as President Diem strengthened his defenses against foes determined to overthrow his regime. Diem had a private army—the Presidential Guard—of some 1,000 selected for devotion to the family. The only regular army unit whose detail was protection of the President and major installations near Saigon was the over-strength 135th Territorial Regiment. The Department of Defense had about 100 red-capped members of the gendarmes who patrolled the streets about the palace, in company with policemen.

With a population of two million, Saigon had one of the largest police forces per capita on earth, including 400 civil disturbance policemen on a 24-hour alert. There were also an unknown number of secret police who busied themselves checking the army, the regular police, the anti-governmental suspects, and one another.

The intensity of the political storm was indicated on July 8 when South Vietnam's most prominent writer, Nguyen Tuong Tam, a Buddhist, committed suicide. On September 9, 100 secret police, supported by a battalion of heavily armed troops, arrested 1,000 Saigon high school students participating in an anti-government demonstration. Five days later, the government arrested civil servants, lawyers and military officers suspected of plotting. In October, scores of students from Saigon schools slipped out of the capital to join the guerrillas.

VIETCONG STRATEGY

Until 1963, the Vietcong depended upon homemade shotguns or old French rifles. Now, they have acquired M-1 Garand rifles, carbines, tommy guns, automatic rifles, 30-caliber machine guns and a few 50-caliber machine guns. All these, with grenade launchers, mortars and homemade rocket launchers, have been used effectively against helicopters. Some Vietcong units have 57-MM recoilless cannon, one of the deadliest of weapons when the target is a light armored vehicle. Some weapons came from China; many more came from the United States. With these, the Vietcong also use bows and arrows; helicopters have been reported limping in with arrows in the fuselages.

The hard core of veteran Vietcong fighters was about 20,000 in 1962. In 1963, when official Vietnamese figures showed thousands of the enemy being slaughtered, the number was estimated at 25,000. Claims included untold numbers of peasants caught in cross-fires. Guerrillas withdrew into the sanctuaries of North Vietnam, Laos and the 6-mile-wide strip of "demilitarized" terrain extending along the Cambodian frontier. In the jungle, where Americans faced daily baths of blood, the bleak future was a possible ten-year war to keep alive the reactionary regime of President Ngo Dinh Diem.

The Vietcong concentrated in the provinces around the capital in the summer of 1963. Some 35 areas south of Saigon contain strong Vietcong units. This defensive position gives the Vietcong time to train

and proselytize. Vietnamese commanders hesitate to take the offensive against them, despite American advisers who urge them into action. Furthermore, the Vietnamese refuse to relinquish obsolete French-built outposts which the enemy overwhelm to attain modern weapons.

The war has many complex features. After 18 years of uncertainty, some 15 million Vietnamese standing on the sidelines saw no victor in 1963. Four out of five of these are peasants who will eventually decide the issues. A peasant is visited by a Vietcong in the night and a government force in the day; with agents from both sides about him, he may pay taxes to both sides. The peasant's loyalty goes to the force that controls his village.

The Vietcong are clever at camouflage. A Vietcong base often stretches for miles through virtually inaccessible terrain, consisting of scattered huts five or six miles apart. A similar situation drove the French from North Vietnam after an eight-year war that killed 94,000.

GUERRILLA PATTERN

The pattern of conflict has followed the three stages of guerrilla warfare outlined by Mao Tse-tung. In the first stage, natives are recruited and indoctrinated and a base is constructed from which weapons, rice and other supplies can be distributed. In the second stage (as in 1963-1964) there are acts of terror, hit-and-run tactics, ambushes, night attacks and assassinations. The third stage becomes civil war, with guerrillas converted into conventional armies, fighting along conventional lines. The Communists are hoping to instigate enough political chaos to destroy the government by coup d'état without entering this stage.

Vietnamese tactics have not been approved by Americans. After nine years of training from the United States Military Advisory Group, with earlier tutelage from the French,

the Vietnamese Army adheres to battlefield formations which may be efficacious for a Korean type of warfare but are not practical when meeting guerrillas in jungled terrain. Vietnamese commanders leave the enemy easy paths of retreat and fail to pursue. Too many Vietnamese officers lack an aggressive spirit and fear casualties.

POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT

The United States and South Vietnam were in conflict in May, 1963, regarding the use of the 14,000 American military advisers. During the summer, these differences came out in the open. Diem and brother Nhu had outlined a plan for military operations which to the Americans seemed too conservative.

One point of disagreement included the manner of dealing with the well-armed Vietcong units. The Americans preferred as much direct contact as possible. They believed the government, superior in arms and reserve, must expect casualties or forfeit the war. Americans favored small-unit actions; stalking patrols, instead of static defenses; wide-spread night fighting and dependence upon the rifle instead of air and artillery power. The time had come, Washington believed, to justify the sacrifices in men and money in order to block the spread of communism in Southeast Asia.²

Particular concern was felt for the situation in the Mekong Delta. The Delta, rice bowl of South Vietnam, is about 10 feet above sea level, serrated by 1,500 miles of canals and 300 miles of streams, containing an area of 26,000 square miles, one of the most fertile regions in the world. The Mekong flows into five channels after a journey of 2,800 miles from Tibet. Here in the Delta, with battles now centered upon the provincial capital of Can Tho, the war will be won or lost by the United States and native soldiery.

STRATEGIC HAMLETS

By 1963, Vietnam's strategic hamlet program had resulted in the construction of 3,700 hamlets holding about 4.5 million Vietnamese. An additional 10,000 hamlets were planned for 1964. Strategic hamlets,

² Total U.S. dead, Jan., 1961-Oct. 24, 1963: 129. The United States economic and military aid was \$500 million in 1963. Total investments by 1964 were about \$3 billion, including military and civilian supplies, food, cash, technical advice.

with barbed wire and sharpened bamboo stockades, are akin to the frontier outposts of yesterday's American West. Here the village militia hold as long as they are able, hoping for rapid arrival of regular army units, often coming by helicopter. To soften the shock for unhappy peasants torn from ancestral plots, hamlets now are constructed around villages. One optimistic report has estimated that only five per cent of the people will be forced to move.

Many American critics of the program believe the Vietnamese government has been depending too heavily on the hamlets as the only solution to the Communist threat. Observers pointed out that most of the hamlets were within areas over which the government had some control; final tests of their value would be met when the hamlets were extended into regions where government forces and guerrilla bands meet face to face. In answer, Saigon maintained that not only would the hamlets break the hold of the Communists on the peasantry; they would also bring the government closer to the people by providing services the Communists constantly promised. The United States earmarked \$68 million to gain the support of the peasantry in the hamlets by building schools and dispensaries, and extending agricultural services. Most of this sum was spent by 1964.

The rosy future of the hamlets was shattered in August, 1963, when guerrillas destroyed 137 of the 200 homes in Bin Tuong. This was built through American aid in 1962—the first strategic hamlet of "Operation Sunrise." The province contains many rubber plantations which have been infiltrated by Communist agents and guerrillas. At the same time, three other early hamlets fell to the enemy because they had been constructed too deep in Communist territory where they were without the protection of government forces.

Vicious Vietcong attacks were made on September 10, 1963, against two district capitals in South Vietnam. The weakness of defenses in these areas brought forth American insistence that construction of

hamlets should cease. The United States, as early as May, 1963, considered the military situation so precarious that it suspended its share (\$100,000) of funds allocated to 65 hamlets in the southern An Xuyen Province.

A committee of American civilian and military officials reported in October, 1963, that the strategic hamlet program in the Mekong Delta was overextended. It called for a temporary halt in construction and suggested concentration on improvements in existing hamlets.

THE WAR WITHIN A WAR

The often quoted figures that 20 per cent of South Vietnam is Catholic and 80 per cent is Buddhist are incorrect. Actually, some 15 per cent are Christian. Thousands embrace the teachings of Confucius and Lao Tze (Taoists). There are some Muslims and Caodaists. Untold numbers are animists and follow rites connected with trees and stones and rivers. The number of devout orthodox Buddhists is small.

In the early years, there were religious persecutions in which Catholics, not Buddhists, suffered. In 1954, when Vietnam was divided after eight years of arduous warfare between France and the Vietminh, there were 1.6 million Catholics out of a population of about 25 million. Of these, 1.2 million lived in the north, which was given to the Communists. According to the Geneva Agreement of 1954, residents of each zone were allowed 300 days to settle in the zone of their choice. Out of 880,000 in the north who sought new homes in the south, 600,000 were Catholics.


President Ngo Dinh Diem depended upon the northern refugees, not so much because they were of his faith as because all were vigorous enemies of communism and better educated than the rural southerners, having resided in the industrialized and urbanized region of North Vietnam. The President and his family were more interested in maintaining power than in theological disputes; they realized that 1.4 million Catholics could not be pitted successfully against 12 million non-Christians. Three out of 19 generals

were Catholic; 1 out of 4 corps commanders was a Catholic; of the 14 high ranking officers in command of the air force, navy, engineers, artillery, signal corps and marines, only 4 were Catholic. The Vice President was a Buddhist; 5 out of 17 Cabinet ministers were Catholic; about one-half of the 123 members of the rump National Assembly were Catholic, being on a higher economic level than most of the Buddhists. The war within a war became another small tragedy in local history because an unrealistic regime refused to broaden the basis of its administration and listen to an intelligent opposition.

The Buddhist crisis came to a head on May 8, 1963, Buddha's birthday, in Hue', where four government tanks fired into a crowd of Buddhists gathered in front of a radio station in protest against a governmental decree prohibiting the broadcasting of a lecture in celebration of the holy day. This ban was the last of a number of orders, one of which was a refusal to allow the flying of Buddhist banners during religious celebrations. This prohibition infuriated the Buddhists because Roman Catholic flags were reported to be flying when Msgr. Ngo Dinh Thuc, Archbishop of Hue', observed his jubilee.

After the killing of nine Buddhists, a delegation of high ranking bonzes (priests) called on the President, demanding that the government admit it had been wrong and rescind the ban on religious flags. The President received the priests with courtesy but refused to retract the official report on the incident which accused a Communist of hurling a grenade into the crowd. The government made a slight concession by removing three provincial officials, including the Governor and security chief of the province in which the incident had occurred. But it took a firm stand against the Buddhists who were being joined by Communists, liberals, politicians without office, Catholics and students. It was clear that the government was being opposed on political and not religious grounds.

The crisis was intensified after a young Buddhist nun burned herself to death in August, the fifth suicide of the conflict, fol-



Reprinted by permission of *The Christian Science Monitor*
—Russell Lenz, Chief Cartographer

VIETNAM

lowed by the resignation of 35 professors of Hue' University. Tran Van Chuong, South Vietnam's Ambassador to the United States and father of Madame Nhu, resigned on August 22 in protest against Saigon's treatment of the Buddhists. His wife also resigned her position as Vietnam's permanent observer at the United Nations. The President ordered nation-wide martial law after troops and police had attacked Buddhist pagodas, arresting hundreds of priests.

Student agitation increased. On August 24, the government ordered the closing of Saigon University and all public and private secondary schools. The following day, some 600 students were arrested and taken to detention camps. Saigon announced on October 19 that it had foiled a plot to overthrow

the Ngo regime through an "organized rebellion of students and intellectuals." These struggles went deeper than Buddhist hatred of a government controlled by a Catholic minority. The contest was between a totalitarian administration whose leaders happened to be Catholics and all individuals and factions in opposition, who saw in the Buddhist persecutions a way to eliminate an unpopular family.

This was a dark picture. There were indecisions within Vietnamese military and civilian circles. There were visits by American senators and congressmen and generals and admirals and journalists and professors, all of whom spoke and wrote conflicting opinions. The United Nations sent a fact-finding commission which encountered barriers erected by Diem agents. (It returned to headquarters, after the coup d'état, without issuing a report.)

The picture brightened, on November 1, 1963, when members of the pro-American officers corps, led by the popular French-trained infantry officer, Major General Duong Van Minh—"Big Minh"—toppled the Ngo family from its throne, bringing death to Diem and Nhu. Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho, a Buddhist, highly regarded in Washington, was named Premier pending elections of a civilian government. After nine long years, Saigon rang with laughter as tens of thousands of Vietnamese rushed from their homes, to cheer and feed the victorious rebel troops, to dance in the streets, to pillage pro-Diem newspapers, to set fire to the residences of Diem officials, to tear down all statues connected with the detested dynasty. Saigon bolstered the sagging morale of the Vietnamese and their friends by broadcasting news of the release of Buddhists, teachers and students, calling upon the people to rally about the new leaders for more aggressive action against the Communists.

The United States and Great Britain recognized the young government on November 7. The new regime contains three parts: (1) The Military Revolution Council (M.R.C.) with a 12-man Executive Committee headed by Major General Duong Van Minh. (He

states that his chief task will be not governmental politics but a powerful offensive against the guerrillas); (2) a 15-man Cabinet of the "provisional government," composed of 3 generals and 12 civilians, obtaining its authority from the delegation of the M.R.C. and led by Premier Nguyen Ngoc Tho; (3) a Council of Sages, an advisory board which will be proposed by the provisional government for M.R.C. approval, giving the suppressed politicians a role in the government.

Out of the bloody and burning issues of 1963, the emergence of the young Vietnamese stands now as an omen of good cheer. They were jailed for demonstrating against the Ngos and against the inept handling of the mild Buddhist protests. The youth in South Vietnam have not gone so far in rebellion as their contemporaries, who helped to drive Syngman Rhee from office in Korea in 1961, and were a determining factor in Japan, where they prevented a visit from President Eisenhower.

Young Vietnamese have plotted for generations to end the encroachments of the Chinese. Many have plotted for almost 100 years against the presence of the French. They have read the works of Victor Hugo, that noble French citizen of the world and been stirred by his words: "No army can withstand the strength of an idea whose time has come." And that time is dawning for all those lands living under the control of foreign masters with alien concepts, and domestic masters remote from the voices of the people. Some day the youth of this distraught land may find, the Fates willing, another Washington, another Bolivar, another Gandhi, to inspire and guide them to freedom.

Thomas E. Ennis was a research consultant in military intelligence in the Office of the General Staff (Washington) during World War II. During the Korean War, he was a staff officer for intelligence on southeast Asia. Previously, he taught history at Yenching University, Peking, from 1924 to 1928. His books include *French Policies and Development in Indochina and Eastern Asia*.

It is this author's belief that ". . . the United States cannot abandon Laos without accepting the additional dangers to our other Southeast Asian allies and friends." He believes, further, that "If Laos or any part of Laos is to be saved as a free country, the United States will have to take action unilaterally, or with Asian and other allies."

The Importance of Laos in Southeast Asia

By FRANK N. TRAGER

Professor of International Affairs, New York University

ONE HUNDRED and three years ago it was not unfashionable for Western historians to agree with Saint-Hilaire's comment that India beyond the Ganges was "scarcely worth a historian's glance."¹ Comments to the effect that Laos was never a country or that the French imperialistically put its pieces together or that it became an independent state "less than 20 years ago" are still to be found in serious articles. Such views tend to throw doubt on the possibility that Laos could exist as a viable state. But they are ill-founded.

Laos was a unified and at times aggressive country at least after the fourteenth century when Fa Ngum was crowned king of the "Land of the Million Elephants." He represented a founder-leader of dynastic Laotian history, heralding the arrival of the Thai-speaking Lao, the dominant and majority ethnolinguistic group in Laos today. These people were preceded by the Kha tribes (*Kha* is a derogative word meaning "savage"), who elected to move or were pushed into the hills by the more aggressive Lao. The latter made the riverside valleys of the Mekong and its tributaries their home and the base of their sedentary wet-rice and monsooned agricultural cultivation. The Kha, like most other "hill tribes" in Southeast Asia, practiced a slash-and-burn type of shifting cultivation.

¹ Quoted in a most useful summary volume, *The Kingdom of Laos*, edited by René de Berval, (Eng. translation), Saigon: France-Asie, 1959, p. 20.

The Lao had descended into the Mekong valleys after the dispersal of the Thai-speaking kingdom of Nanchao by the Mongols of China at the end of the thirteenth century.

Two other major tribal groupings, both later arrivals than the Lao, must be noted. These are the Thai-speaking tribes from Yunnan and Southwestern China, and the Man and Meo, more sinicized tribes, from related areas. These are "hill peoples," who seem to prefer the uplands and heights of the Annamite Chain, an arc of the descending Himalayas, that divides Laos from the two Vietnams.

Dutch and Jesuit accounts of Laos in the sixteenth century describe it as an expansionist and prosperous kingdom based on adequate food, fiber, gross and precious minerals, including gold. By the end of the seventeenth century its national unity had succumbed—as did other southeast Asian states—to internal disunity from which it has yet to recover. External pressure from Siam and Annam (Vietnam) in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was partly responsible for keeping it divided.

Three major petty kingdoms or "fiefdoms" survived throughout these years, frequently by acknowledging some kind of tributary or protective arrangement with a superior power. These were: the kingdoms of Luang Prabang, the present seat of the Royal Laotian capital; Vientiane, which disappeared as such but became the seat of the French and the present

Laotian Administration,² and the kingdom of the South, known variously as Bassac or Champassak, present stronghold of pro-Western Laotian elements whose former royal family is headed by Prince Boun Oum.³

FRENCH HEGEMONY

Divisions within Laos persisted throughout the French hegemony over the parts of Laos. In 1893, French encroachments on Siamese (Thai) territory—one of the factors which contributed to Thailand's later declaration of war, January 25, 1942, against the Allies—led to a treaty which advanced French Indo-chinese interests into the three main areas of Laos. France became a protector of Sisavang Vong of Luang Prabang who remained on his throne. Elsewhere in Laos, France established more direct rule. The careful student should note that the kingdom of Luang Prabang, an integral part of Laos, has had a continuous history and royal leadership since its founding in the fourteenth century.

During World War II, the Lao gradually re-acquired rights of self-rule under the Japanese, especially in the areas formerly ruled directly by the French. Just before the latter returned after the war, the Vientiane family of Prince Phetsarath (now deceased) organized and established an independent Free Lao or Lao Issara movement which held power in Laos briefly between October, 1945, and April, 1946. This group, including Phetsarath (who was married to a Siamese wife) and his brothers, Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong, fled to Bangkok when the French re-established their power.

However, between 1946 and 1949, the French took major steps to support the unity of Laos under Sisavang Vong at Luang Prabang. Following an August, 1946, *modus vivendi*, a Constituent Assembly was convened in March, 1947. A democratic constitution

² It contributed to Luang Prabang the vice-regal family of Own Keo whose grandsons, Princes Phetsarath, Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong, figure so prominently in Laotian affairs.

³ The latter yielded his dynastic rights in a secret protocol to the August, 1946, *modus vivendi* between the French and King Sisavang Vong of Luang Prabang (1903-1959) which recognized the latter as the royal domestic authority over a re-united Laos.

for a united Laos was promulgated by the King in May, and in July, 1949, a Franco-Laotian Convention recognized the independence of the kingdom within the framework of the Associated States of Indochina. On October 24, 1949, the exiled Lao Issara movement decided formally to dissolve because its goal—*independence*—was being achieved.

For personal reasons, Prince Phetsarath elected to remain in Bangkok. Prince Souvanna Phouma and 24 other notables were flown to Vientiane to rejoin and serve the government, typically dominated by élite families. Phouma became the third premier of the united country after the August, 1951, elections (his predecessors being Prince Boun Oum and Phoui Sananikone). Laos became fully independent following the Franco-Laotian Treaty of Friendship and Association signed on October 22, 1953, and was admitted to the United Nations, after the Geneva Accords, on December 14, 1955.

But Prince Souphanouvong, the third brother, already in touch with President Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam, refused to accept this solution. He had authorized raids on the new government after 1949, for which he was reportedly read out of the Lao Issara. He and his followers had gone to North Vietnam where, with the help of the Viet Minh, he had established the Pathet Lao. By 1953-1954, the Pathet Lao-Viet Minh complex launched its first significant attacks on Laos, proclaiming itself a "liberation" movement and a "Free Lao" government. The Pathet Lao made inroads in Sam Neua province (where Souphanouvong established a base) and, to a lesser extent, in Phong Saly province.

THE GENEVA ACCORDS

Over the justifiable objections of the Royal Lao government, the 1954 Geneva Accords awarded recognition in these two provinces to the Pathet Lao, recommending that it be included in a new government, after free and fair elections, following a proven cease-fire. These Geneva Agreements also provided that Phong Saly and Sam Neua be returned to the administration of the Royal Government

and that all foreign military forces except a specified number of French military training forces should withdraw. An International Commission of Supervision and Control (I.C.C.) composed of representatives of India (chairman), Canada and Poland was named to insure the execution of these provisions.

Premier Phouma believed that he could make peace with his brother. He began negotiations in August-September, 1954, but his government fell, following the assassination of Defense Minister Kou Voravong on September 19. His successor, Katay Sasorith, had fewer illusions about negotiations with the Communists although he faithfully tried to carry out the Geneva 1954 decisions.

The Royal Lao government held a series of conferences with the Pathet Lao, looking toward the execution of these Accords: at the airfield of the Plaine des Jarres, in early 1955; at Vientiane in July; at Rangoon in September-October. None were successful. They were followed by a full-scale though unsuccessful attack by the Pathet Lao forces on the Royal Army in Sam Neua.

Elections in December, 1955, brought Phouma back to power for a second time in March, 1956. He promptly renewed his efforts to come to terms with his brother, Souphanouvong. From August, 1956, until

November, 1957—with one summer interruption when he was again out of power—Phouma worked to resolve the conflict. On paper, he secured an agreement which brought the Pathet Lao into the government. Presumably the administration of the two disputed provinces, Sam Neua and Phong Saly, was turned over to the Royal government. But, for the most part, this remained a paper solution. The Pathet Lao entered the government but never surrendered the basis of its military power and its locations in the two provinces.⁴

Elections held in some 21 Laotian constituencies, mainly in the two provinces, in May, 1958, gave an outstanding victory to the Pathet Lao and its allies. The Pathet Lao and its allies captured 13 seats in the enlarged 59 member Assembly. The pro-government parties actually won 712,000 votes against 280,000 for the Communists and their allies—but lost the election. The pro-Royal government party was hopelessly divided by personalities. This event alarmed the anti-Communists who then combined to oust Phouma in August, 1958.

Phoui Sananikone, representing the combined Rally of the Laotian People party, again became prime minister with the full support of the United States.⁵ He announced his determination to contest Communist ideology, subversion and Pathet Lao infiltration at every point. He sought international agreements instead of the “neutralist” and “soft” policies of Phouma. He rejected negotiations proposed by North Vietnam and denounced its military support for the Communist Pathet Lao rebels. With United States support and backed by the findings of an investigating sub-committee of the United Nations Security Council (Argentina, Italy, Japan and France) he successfully withstood renewed insurgent attacks in 1959.

CONFUSION IN 1960

Nineteen hundred and sixty was a fateful year in Laos.⁶ In January, Phoui's government fell to a group of “young Turks,” known as the Committee for the Defense of National

⁴ As the *New York Times* (August 6, 1956) pointed out, the terms of the agreement between the two brothers were almost identical to the demands previously announced by the Peking Radio. Souvanna Phouma tacitly recognized Peking's role by promptly visiting Communist China and getting Chou En-lai's “agreement” to the negotiated terms. *Ibid.*, August 26, 1956. Phouma stopped off in Hanoi also to perform the same ceremony.

⁵ Useful summary accounts through 1957 will be found in Katay Sasorith, *Le Laos. Son evolution politique-Sa place dans l'Union Française*. Paris: Edition Berger-Levrault, 1953; Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *Minority Problems in Southeast Asia*, Stanford University Press, 1955, pp. 197-211; Donald Lancaster, *The Emancipation of French Indochina*, Oxford University Press, 1961, in *passim* and especially pp. 400-406.

⁶ Those events through 1960 and early 1961 may be followed in (White Paper), *The Situation in Laos*, Washington: Department of State, September, 1959; A. M. Halpern and H. B. Fredman, *Communist Strategy in Laos*, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1960; and in briefer articles in *Current History* by Thomas E. Ennis, March, 1961, and G. C. Hickey and A. Suddard, December, 1961.

Interests (C.D.N.I.), headed by General Phoumi Nosavan and Prince Boun Oum. King Savang Vatthana then appointed Khou Abhay provisional premier. In April, 1960, the C.D.N.I. captured what was generally regarded as a rigged anti-Communist election; this brought into power a government headed by Prince Tiao Somsanith.

It was surprised and overthrown by the Kong Le coup in August, 1960. Souvanna Phouma was (for the third or fourth time, depending on how one counts his second appearance in 1957) installed as premier. Promptly, as if he never learned from any experience, he sought to negotiate again with his Communist brother, leader of the Pathet Lao.

During this confusion, the United States at first supported both Phouma and Nosavan and Boun Oum. When this latter pro-Western group recaptured Vientiane in December, the United States decided to recognize and again to assist it.

There is little doubt that the United States inherited a difficult problem in Laos. The Communist countries continued to recognize the government of Souvanna Phouma, in exile, as the "legitimate" government. The Soviet Union had increased its military aid by an extensive air lift to the Pathet Lao. Kong Le and his forces had joined with the latter and together they were battering the Boun Oum-Nosavan government. Our Western allies in Seato made it clear at the March, 1961, meeting in Bangkok that they looked with disfavor on any large scale United States or Seato involvement in Laos—despite the fact that the Protocol of Seato expressly provided for the defense of Laos in such a situation. The United States made it clear that it would opt for withdrawal from Laos if its neutrality and peace could be sustained on the basis of a coalition government including the Communist Pathet Lao.

On April 2, 1961, *Pravda* published what

⁷ See a most useful collection of documents, George Modelska, *International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question 1961-2*, Canberra: The Australian National University, 1962, and Frank N. Trager, "Never Negotiate Freedom: The Case of Laos and Vietnam," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 1, No. 11 (January, 1963), pp. 3-11.

purported to be the text of memorandum from the Soviet Union to the United Kingdom in reply to one from that country. As co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference of 1954, the Soviets proposed that they, with the United Kingdom, "should immediately call for a cease fire in Laos," the reactivation of the International Control Commission and "negotiations between the different political factions in Laos." However, the memorandum warned Britain that the coup government of the now deposed Souvanna Phouma was recognized as the "legitimate government" of Laos.

A SECOND GENEVA CONFERENCE

Out of this exchange and with the obvious concurrence of the United States, plans were made for another Geneva conference, after a *de facto* cease-fire was allegedly accomplished.⁷

The Geneva agreements of 1962 included two basic documents: the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and a Protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos. These provide for a "peaceful, neutral, independent, democratic, unified and prosperous Laos," to be attained by (1) a coalition government committed to the "five principles of peaceful coexistence" (first put forward by Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-Lai in 1954); (2) friendly and diplomatic relations with all countries but "first and foremost" with "the neighbouring countries," i.e., Communist China and North Vietnam; (3) elimination of foreign military alliances, foreign military forces and bases, and Seato protection with the limited exception of French military instructors (Article 5 of the Protocol); (4) "unconditional aid" from any source; (5) the reactivation of the I.C.C. charged with the responsibility for supervising and maintaining the "ceasefire," the withdrawal of foreign regular and irregular troops, and for inspection and investigation by majority vote but "decisions" by unanimous vote.

The I.C.C. was to have at its disposal "the means of communication and transport required for the performance of its duties," provided either by the Royal Laotian govern-

ment or by the I.C.C. The British and Soviet co-chairmen were to receive periodic reports from the I.C.C. on its progress and when necessary on any violations of the above agreements. They were also to "exercise supervision over the observance" of the Protocol and the Declaration, to inform the other signatories and to consult with each other and with them as may be required.

AFTER GENEVA

Obviously the future of Laos has not been insured by the Geneva Protocol and Declaration of 1962. Since July, 1962, Communist violations of the cease-fire have been steady, if at irregular intervals. It took some 14 months to negotiate these agreements, in no small part because the pro-Western faction of Boun Oum and General Nosavan rightly refused until June, 1962, to agree to the troika-type coalition provided for at Geneva. And in this, history was on their side. There is no record of a Communist party in or out of a coalition giving up its avowed objectives of securing domination by aboveboard or underground methods. The Pathet Lao is no exception. Saddling Laos with a coalition troika merely provided the Communists with freedom and legality to act so to endanger further the security of Laos.

Since July, 1962, the I.C.C. has reported that United States and Philippine forces within Laos, totalling approximately 1,000 have been withdrawn. Only 40 North Vietnamese have left; estimates of their number within Laos run from 5,000 to 10,000. The Pathet Lao has not dissolved its armed forces, although a 30,000-man integrated national army and a 6,000-man national police force had been agreed on in November, 1962. The I.C.C. has apparently been prevented from completing any on-the-spot investigations. It has succeeded in holding only two 48-hour investigations since the meetings at Geneva in 1962.

⁸ See "End to Laotian Neutralism," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), April 25, 1963, pp. 209-211; *The Guardian* (Rangoon), representing semi-official Burmese opinion, was sufficiently alarmed to report events extensively. See April 22-29, 1963; *The New York Times* for April gave almost daily coverage.

In April, 1963, fighting erupted in the Plaine des Jarres to the advantage of the Pathet Lao. The United States was sufficiently alarmed to send a portion of its fleet for "precautionary" activities to the Gulf of Siam and to authorize W. Averell Harriman as a special envoy of the late President Kennedy once again to seek Soviet Premier Khrushchev's support for a new cease-fire.⁸ He returned with the optimistic belief that he had such support.

On April 19, Souvanna Phouma addressed appeals to London and Moscow to intervene as the Geneva Conference co-chairmen to stop the fighting in Laos. In October, 1963, he visited both London and Moscow, again actively attempting to enlist their aid because the fighting became more intense after the monsoonal rains had stopped. As of November, 1963, the co-chairmen could not even agree on terms which would allow them to intervene to halt Pathet Lao attacks on the helicopters of the I.C.C. investigating missions.

What are the probable effects of Communist gain in Laos? Is Laos a falling domino that will knock down the others? Is it a pivot, a keystone in the arch, a linch pin which holds the wheel in place? How relevant to the real situation are such analogies? Here we enter the area of estimates and projections, always hazardous.

(Continued on page 117)

Frank N. Trager is author and editor of many works on Southeast Asia, including *Burma*, (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 3 vols., 1956); *Marxism in Southeast Asia*, (Stanford University Press: 1959); *Building A Welfare State in Burma*, (N. Y.: I.P.R., 1958). He has served as "Point Four" Director in Burma and revisited Southeast Asia in 1956, 1958 and 1962. He has been a Visiting Professor on the faculties of the National War College, 1961-1963, and Yale University, 1960-1961. He has also lectured extensively for the Army War College, the Defense Intelligence School and the Foreign Service Institute.

Statement on U. S. Asian Policy

On August 20, 1963, Roger Hilsman, United States Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, addressed the National Legislative Conference at Honolulu, Hawaii, on "the stake that America has in Pacific affairs," and encouraging signs of political progress there. Excerpts of his address summarizing United States strategy and policy follow:

Some of the new nations of South and East Asia have experienced political difficulties, and in several instances these have been severely aggravated, if not caused, by the Communists. But beneath a somewhat disordered surface are both a basic stability and encouraging signs of the growth of deeper roots for democratic institutions.

One of the weakest political and administrative links in many Asian societies, as in most other developing countries, is the connection between city and village, between the central government and the countryside. Communism seeks to exploit the weakness of these links and, in doing so, forces the central government to pay more attention to them. In several Asian countries, actions taken to cope with terrorist warfare inspired by the Communists have led directly to a strengthening of democracy at the grassroots. That happened in Malaya and the Philippines. Somewhat the same process is going on today in South Vietnam, where the strategic-hamlet program is establishing local self-government and strengthening the administrative and political links between the rural people and their national government. This program is not only helping South Vietnam to defeat the Communists but will help it to advance politically and economically and socially after the Communist guerrillas have been completely eliminated. South Vietnam has the resources—not least the character of its people—for a quite brilliant future. Actually, its progress from the end of the Indochinese

war in 1954 until 1959 was one of the most remarkable in Asia. Probably it was that striking success, especially when contrasted with the failure of the vaunted Communist "paradise" in North Vietnam, which prompted the latter to resume its assault of organized terrorism on South Vietnam in 1959.

India's large-scale community development program has, from its beginning, combined the stimulation of democratic roots with social and economic progress. Pakistan likewise has been strengthening the village roots of democracy.

Some of the new and reborn nations of Asia have not yet achieved fully functioning, stable democracies. But nearly all have democracy as their goal. A few are operating democratic institutions with creditable success. And Japan has illustrated how a democratic system can provide effective leadership that can overcome, in a single generation, the mistakes of the past and lay the social and economic, as well as the political, base for continuing democracy and freedom.

Democracy will develop in free Asia, provided that the free Asian peoples preserve their independence. And generally they have proved themselves to be thoroughly determined to preserve their independence.

We see also in free Asia some encouraging trends toward closer cooperation. Japan and Australia are undertaking larger roles in promoting the development and stability of the

(Continued on page 118)

BOOK REVIEWS

SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

AMERICANS AND CHINESE: A HISTORICAL ESSAY AND A BIBLIOGRAPHY. By KWANG-CHING LIU. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963. 192 pages and index, \$4.50.)

Dr. Liu, the author of *Anglo-American Steamship Rivalry in China, 1862-1874* (1962), rendered an invaluable service to scholars and the interested public by presenting a succinct and informative summary of the past relations between Americans and Chinese on a non-governmental level. His essay ranges over the many facets of American commercial, religious, educational, and philanthropic enterprises in China as well as the Chinese who went to the United States. The classified bibliography of English materials, both published and unpublished, will be an indispensable companion for scholars of modern China and of American foreign relations.

Chöng-Sik Lee
University of Pennsylvania

MAJOR GOVERNMENTS OF ASIA. 2nd edition. EDITED BY GEORGÉ MCT. KAHIN. By Harold C. Hinton, Nobutaka Ike, Norman D. Palmer, Keith Callard and Richard S. Wheeler, George Mct. Kahin. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963. 719 pages and index, \$10.00).

Students of Asian affairs will applaud the revised and expanded second edition of this comprehensive volume on the five major governments of Asia—China, India, Indonesia, Japan and Pakistan. The contributors, each an eminent specialist in his field, have organized their material in interesting, analytical fashion. Each chapter has been brought up to date and contains a useful annotated bibliography. A solid, scholarly, readable account, this volume

remains a leader in the field of Asian government.

A.Z.R.

SOUTHEAST ASIA IN UNITED STATES POLICY. By RUSSELL H. FIFIELD (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. 488 pages, bibliographical note and index, \$6.50; \$2.50 in paper).

The current crisis in South Vietnam, the militant posturing of Indonesia toward the newly established nation of Malaysia, and the quiescent but potentially unsettling situation in Laos, have all focused attention of Americans on the problems and politics of Southeast Asia. Russell H. Fifield, Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan, has written a comprehensive, illuminating, thoughtful study which will prove of great value to all who are interested in this strategic region. "This book seeks to set forth current conditions and problems and develop a rationale for American policy"

After tracing the evolution of American interest in Southeast Asia, the author analyzes the policies and tactics of Communist China, the establishment and rôle of Seato, and "the various forms of indirect aggression—infiltration, subversion, and insurgency—" used by the Communists in their efforts to undermine non-Communist régimes. The economics problems of the area are dealt with in detail, as are the relationships between the United States and the ruling élites in the various countries. Professor Fifield's recommendations deserve careful attention: a more systematic effort to encourage greater involvement by Japan and India in Southeast Asian regionalist developments; encouragement of a genuine neutralism; a willingness in Washington to come to grips with the diplomatic and military challenge posed by Communist China; the assign-

(Continued on page 118)

PAKISTAN

(Continued from page 77)

gigantic Indus Basin project in West Pakistan, to be financed by special grants from a number of countries under the aegis of the World Bank, is under way, although initial progress has been slow and estimates of the total cost of the project are steadily rising.

In general, Pakistan's progress on the economic front has been far more impressive than its "teeming stagnation" in politics or its limited steps in social and educational reform. Eventually, of course, it must achieve a greater national consensus, and develop greater momentum in its struggle for survival and progress. In a message to the nation on Pakistan Day (March 23), 1963, President Ayub Khan reminded his people of some of the enduring and constructive aspects of their tradition:

This country would endure long after you and I are gone. But on what terms it will endure, will depend entirely on what you and I are also to achieve together. The heart of the country is sound, the ideals that inspired this country into being are imperishable, the faith that, through the ages, sustained our people is invincible. We are heirs of the finest system of social justice ever devised. And we have in our country as good a human material as exists anywhere in the world. This is what we can build upon, this is our strength, this is the foundation on which this country can be built.

INDIA

(Continued from page 82)

neglect both the organisational interest and public welfare. Rivalry between the ministerial and organisational wings as well as factionalism within ministries and regional committees have made the party a house divided against itself.

As a result, faith and confidence in the party have dwindled. To arrest this downward march, the Kamaraj plan proposed that senior ministers at the Centre and in the States must renounce their positions; at the call of the organisation they must be willing to exchange ministerial posts for more humdrum but necessary work of organising and providing grassroots leadership.

The response of the All India Congress Committee, the top central organisation of the party, was immediate and impressive. In a meeting in August, 1963, it accepted the plan unanimously and entrusted Nehru with the task of implementing it. The dramatic submission of hundreds of resignations of ministers at the Centre and the States followed. Eventually, however, the resignations of only six Chief Ministers of the States and six Cabinet Ministers at the Centre were accepted. Among these were such party stalwarts as Kamaraj, L. B. Shastri, Morarji Desai and S. K. Patil.

While the Kamaraj plan was hailed by some observers as a significant and unique development, others have characterised it as a clever device by Nehru to get rid of "controversial and inconvenient" ministers like Desai and Patil. Critics include some within the party as well as many from the Opposition. They believe that the Kamaraj plan would facilitate the re-establishment of the unchallenged supremacy of the Prime Minister and the habilitation of his somewhat tarnished image in the wake of the Chinese attack. They even wonder whether this plan may not pave the way for the election of Nehru's hand-picked successor.

It is too early to judge the far-reaching consequences of the Kamaraj plan. But one thing is already clear. Except for Kamaraj and Shastri, none of the ministers who left office seems to be happy. Some of them have been bitter and even critical of the Prime Minister. As for Kamaraj and Shastri, they have no reason to be pessimistic about the political future. The former is earmarked for the highest office of the party, the presidency; the latter is so high in the esteem of the Prime Minister that he can return to the government whenever he chooses.

The Kamaraj plan intended primarily to strengthen the party organisation. But its effect so far appears to have been not so much on the organisation of the party as on the government and the administration. The Government at New Dehli is undoubtedly more homogeneous and better united than ever before and is fully under the Prime Min-

ister's own control. But from the Congress party's point of view the organisation is still not out of the woods. Kamaraj's task (as party president) will be Herculian even if he secures the unqualified support of every member of the party. Such support is unlikely. Herein lies the weakness of the whole scheme.

The picture that India presents in the sixteenth year of her independence is indeed most discouraging. With Nehru in his seventy-fifth year and waning in health and vigour, the Indian-Chinese conflict is still unsettled; India's relationship with her closest neighbor, Pakistan, is at its worst; the pace of economic development under the third five year plan is disappointing; discipline and morale within the ruling Congress party are at their lowest; and the discontent and frustration among the Indian masses are increasing. But this does not mean that the situation is hopeless. On the contrary, it offers a great challenge and opportunity to the leadership of a country of 450 million people.

MALAYSIA

(Continued from page 94)

were optimistic that an enlarged tariff-free domestic market would greatly benefit their budding light industry. The Singapore government also agreed to make a partially interest-free loan to facilitate economic development in the Borneo territories.

The initial reaction to the Malaysian proposal in 1961 by many Bornean leaders had been markedly negative. This sprang from their fears of Malay domination and preference for retaining familiar British controls as they moved slowly toward self-government. Most of this resistance was eliminated by the Alliance government's skillful public relations campaign. This brought many Bornean visitors to Kuala Lumpur to view the considerable economic progress made by the Federation since 1957 and to listen to the Tunku's firm assurances that Malaysia was conceived as a genuine partnership of its disparate peoples. Furthermore, certain constitutional safeguards were accorded the Bornean territories, the most important being virtually autonomous control over immigration.

Shortly after Malaysia Day, in a hastily called election, Lee Kuan-yew's P.A.P. moderate Socialist government was returned to office and the P.A.P. pro-Communist splinter, the Barisan Socialis, was badly defeated. It was a stunning and consequential electoral victory for Lee. The P.A.P. won 37 out of 51 seats, the Barisan 13. For two years he had held a razor-thin margin in the Singapore Legislative Assembly, narrowly defeating Barisan attempts to overturn his Government. Not only had he become a symbol of the pro-Malaysian struggle in Singapore; at the same time he had stoutly defended Singapore's position in the new state against presumed encroachment by the Malayan Finance Minister, Tan Siew Sin, who was also head of the Malaysian Chinese Association, a component of the Federation Alliance party. After the election, an abortive attempt of Barisan-dominated labor unions to call a general strike in Singapore further underscored the unexpected weakness of Lee's local opposition.

Lee Kuan-yew was the logical spokesman, and future leader, for a moderate leftist alternative to the conservative Alliance government in Malaysia. But in the long controversy over the Malaysian proposal all the other Malaysian Socialist parties had taken an unyielding anti-Malaysian position and, in 1962, had expelled the P.A.P. from a Socialist conference in Kuala Lumpur. Lee's future political prospects rested mainly on his capacity to transcend his somewhat narrow power base in Singapore. In the meantime, the control of Malaysia's four component parts by pro-Malaysian political groupings promised a desirable initial period of political stability.

In summary, the primary advantages attending the birth of Malaysia were: 1) an experienced Government pledged to a nationwide expansion of its moderate program for rural development and light industrialization; 2) the political predominance of the multi-racial Alliance party which, under the Tunku's leadership, attenuated the extremes of Malay nationalism and Chinese chauvinism; 3) substantial defense support and a de-

gree of economic assistance from chiefly Western sources; and 4) a prior validation by an international agency of the degree of Bornean pro-Malaysian sentiment. Offsetting these were, above all, the intensity of Indonesian hostility and the larger unresolved question of the loyalty of the Chinese population in the face of future regional expansion by Communist China. These were sufficiently grave considerations to make an optimistic prognosis for Malaysia unwarranted.

BURMA

(Continued from page 88)

them to take part in the limited legal political activity open to the public.

While this policy brought some joy to the peasantry who were the innocent victims of the internal warfare in Burma, it did not gain unanimous acclaim from the former responsible leaders. A.F.P.F.L. heads, U Ba Swe and U Kyaw Nyein, raised serious questions and doubts about restoring full citizenship to men and women who had dedicated their lives to destroying the government and the Union, while holding in jail the elected leaders who had devoted their energies to defending the constitution and the democratic process. Similar criticisms were raised by other leaders, and, on August 10, 1963, the Revolutionary Council struck back by arresting those who spoke out. In early October, when criticism continued, further arrests were made. As the second year of the dictatorship drew to a close, the repressive character of the political system became more evident.

To evaluate the political record of the military, it is necessary to note certain things about its composition and history. Its senior leaders helped to organize and direct the early phase of the pre-independence nationalist movement. Its claim to political leadership in 1962 stemmed in part from this heritage and in part from the belief that the military in Burma is better fitted for stewardship than its civilian counterparts. Added to this was the memory of the military's leadership during the Caretaker Regime and its resolve to avoid the mistakes made then. But, by arresting or driving to cover the nat-

ural civil leaders, the military dictators have created a partial vacuum at the top of the society which they and the returning rebel leaders seek to fill.

A RISKY GAMBLE

The coup leaders are hopeful that their policies toward the masses, their program for building socialism rapidly and their near-monopoly of arms will win the support of those who agree with them and command the silent acceptance of those who do not. This is a risky gamble; if the military leaders are divided or their policies fail, the restored rebel leaders stand a good chance of inheriting their power. The coup leaders clashed in February, 1963, and they could clash again.

The present Revolutionary Council's policy of building socialism without the full support of the intelligentsia and the natural élite puts a great strain upon the military's limited supply of technically trained personnel and threathens to weaken both the efficiency of the army and the prospects of fulfilling the socio-economic plans. By restoring internal peace and maintaining a true neutrality in the cold war the leaders in Burma hope to reduce their military needs for skilled personnel and to use the surplus to fill the void created by the defection of the educated classes. These are dangerous decisions, both for the nation's internal problems and for its external defense.

UNITED STATES POLICY

(Continued from page 70)

dous area of maneuverability in its steady drive for influence and power over Asia. It provides Peking with almost limitless possibilities for local initiatives which can upset the delicate balance of internal politics in country after country. An increase of pressure in Nepal, a border raid in the Northeast Frontier Agency of India, support for Pakistan on the Kashmir question, stirring up the tribal minorities in Burma, and supplying the guerrillas in Laos and Vietnam while offering unlimited aid to Cambodia "without strings,"—all represent action which the Peking regime

can take and to which there can be only limited response by the United States and the West.

Communist China's actual power and capability are far less important to the peoples across her southern frontiers than the *impression* of Chinese Communist power and the daily and continuing efforts by the Chinese Communists to increase their influence, efforts which are often visible to those who count in the smaller countries. Willingness to use any means, open or covert, gives the Communists significant advantages in an area such as south and southeast Asia, an advantage which the United States and its Western allies have not yet been able to devise means to counter effectively.

The Chinese Communists are desperately and continually bending their efforts to convince 600 million people that communism is the wave of the future. Their dogma and their tightly-controlled totalitarian system offer a design for living that would substitute the dictates of a few for the difficult tasks of responsible citizenship and would substitute iron discipline for the chance for independence. To millions of people accustomed for thousands of years to authoritarian rule and with only a brief experience with free self-government, the Communist prospect is alluring indeed.

So far, the United States and the West have not provided a simple and easily acceptable alternative, for there is none. The task of American policy in southern Asia, therefore, must be to continue the burden of protecting the weaker nations from loss of freedom where possible; to continue the burden of providing some of the sinews for the slow process of their economic, social and political development. But in the last resort, American policy must rest on our faith that only when these nations are free and strong can we have any security for ourselves and our children.

LAOS

(Continued from page 111)

But I suggest that the answer emerges from the following premises: (1) The continuation

of the Geneva, 1962, agreements dooms Laos to another Communist take-over. (2) Laos at this time and in this condition makes more difficult our commitment to and in Vietnam. (3) The erosion of what remains of freedom in Laos increases the anxiety and the insecurity of our ally, Thailand. (4) Burma increasingly recedes into a type of neutral isolationism, hoping perhaps thereby to avoid the oncoming danger. Thus, mainland southeast Asia would be further endangered by the loss of Laos; in that sense Laos is a pivot in the defense of the area.

What to do? Withdraw? Let Laos go down the Communist drain? If the foregoing analysis is correct, the United States cannot abandon Laos without accepting the additional dangers to our other southeast Asian allies and friends. Neutralization of all southeast Asia was a favorite suggestion at one time in India and now, perhaps in Paris. But neutralization requires guarantees and agreements and expectancy of reasonable international honesty. None such may be expected in the case of the Communists in Laos.

If Laos or any part of Laos is to be saved as a free country, the United States will have to take action unilaterally, or with Asian and other allies. The kingdom of Luang Prabang has had enough internal coherence to provide for its continuity since the fourteenth century. Bassac or Champassak, that is, the area of the South, may be similarly regarded. In effect, the Mekong river valley or the western portion of the "pan" of Laos and the "handle" of the pan, i.e., the region of Vientiane and the South, can be welded together into a Lao kingdom, independent and free, albeit partitioned.

In this case, Phong Saly, Sam Neua and a part of Xieng Khouang province would be lost to the Communists because of the collective failure to thwart the Communist advance.

Such partition requires intervention, not neutrality. If we do not intervene soon and shoulder a major burden until the free Lao can defend their own heritage, then Laos, a pivot in mainland southeast Asia, will be irretrievably lost.

U.S. POLICY STATEMENT

(Continued from page 112)

Pacific area. The Philippines are manifesting increasing leadership.

• • •

The cooperative activities of existing regional organizations, such as the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), have grown apace, and new organizations, such as the Asian Productivity Organization, have been created to respond to new needs as these have been recognized by the countries of the area. Seato and Anzus continue as important symbols of joint commitment to the independence of the countries of the area as well as important foci of cooperative activity to deal with the Communist threat. While relatively weak and relatively limited in scope and character, these cooperative activities among the nations of Asia and the Pacific reflect important long-term impulses.

In the light of long-term trends in Communist and free Asia let me now review the elements of U.S. strategy and policy. Our policy in the Far East can be summed up in these four points:

1. to stand firmly behind our commitments to the defense of independent nations and to turn back any aggressive thrust from communism;
2. to contribute as we are able to the prosperity and development of nations which request our assistance as the surest way of helping to build a system of free, viable, and strong nations in Asia;
3. to recognize the value of initiatives by the Pacific nations themselves to develop their own modes of cooperation and communication, and to stand ready to assist when called upon to do so;
4. to work patiently for the realization of a Pacific community of nations so prosperous and progressive that its attraction will prove, in the long run, irresistible to those peoples now kept by their rulers from participation in it.

• • •

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 113)

ment only of first-class foreign service personnel to the area; and an intensification of programs designed to help these countries of Southeast Asia develop stable, expanding economies.

A.Z.R.

FOREIGN POLICIES IN A WORLD OF CHANGE. BY JOSEPH E. BLACK AND KENNETH W. THOMPSON (editors). (New York: Harper and Row, 1963. 731 pages and index, \$10.00).

An outstanding characteristic of this book is that the authors of its 24 chapters, except in two instances, are drawn from the nation (or in chapter 14, the region) concerned. By covering a broad spectrum of nations throughout the world and by focusing the discussions on the "multiplicity of factors which might be classed as determinants in influencing the policy" of the nations, the editors attempt with much success to provide the basis for more analytical comparison of foreign policies. The factors considered to be important are: historical configuration, geography, natural resources, industrial development, military capacity, population, government, leadership, and diplomacy.

The pattern and the quality of discussion by individual contributors is not uniform. Idiosyncrasies and the degree of sophistication of the authors and their nations are reflected in each chapter. The Russian authors follow an "ideological approach," presenting the Soviet official position without mitigation. The book, however, contains many succinct analytical chapters unsurpassed in quality. It is a valuable addition to the fields of comparative foreign policies and international relations.

Chong-Sik Lee
University of Pennsylvania

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of December, 1963, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

The Month in Review

By MARY KATHARINE HAMMOND

Instructor of History, Ohio Northern University

INTERNATIONAL

Arab League

Dec. 17—The Economic Council of the Arab League denounces Britain's attitude "concerning the Zionist campaign against Arab boycott machinery."

Dec. 27—Twelve of the 13 Arab League states agree to attend a heads-of-state conference to discuss unified action against Israel if she diverts water from the Jordan River.

Berlin

(See also *Germany, East*)

Dec. 27—The United States protests to the Soviet Union over the killing of an East German youth by East German guards at the Berlin wall on Christmas Day.

Dec. 28—Soviet authorities reject the U.S. protest, insisting the affair does not concern the Soviet Union but is a matter to be handled through the East German regime.

Central America

Dec. 13—The Ministers of Economy of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua sign a protocol setting up a common customs procedure.

Dec. 14—Defense ministers of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama sign the protocol establishing a Central American Defense Council to "combat the infiltration of international communism."

European Economic Community (Common Market)

Dec. 23—The Council of Ministers agrees to French demands to open the internal markets of Common Market members to French farm products by the end of the year. The Council also agrees to adopt a common

position for all six members in forthcoming trade negotiations with the U.S.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato)

Dec. 16—U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk tells the annual ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council that the group should strengthen the peaceful coexistence tendencies of the Soviet Union as a check to Communist China's militant policy. A message from President Johnson assures the ministers that the U.S. will keep 6 divisions in Europe as long as necessary and desired.

Dec. 17—U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara warns the Council that the U.S. public and Congress will grow restless unless local European forces are strengthened.

Britain, warning that its forces in Malaysia are facing a long and dangerous campaign, urges Nato members not to permit arms shipments to Indonesia that may be used against British troops.

A communiqué ending the ministerial meeting stresses the importance of seeking agreement on "limited measures" to end East-West tension.

Organization of American States

Dec. 3—The O.A.S. votes to investigate charges that Cuba smuggled arms into Venezuela in an effort to subvert democracy in that country.

United Nations

Dec. 4—The Security Council unanimously approves a resolution urging a world-wide arms embargo against South Africa until it abandons its policy of apartheid.

Dec. 6—The Security Council begins hearings

on means to enforce its July 31 resolution calling on Portugal to grant independence to its African territories.

Dec. 11—The Security Council adopts a resolution calling for increased pressure on Portugal to accept the U.N. "interpretation of self-determination."

Dec. 16—Zanzibar and Kenya are admitted to U.N. membership, bringing that organization's roster to 113 states.

Secretary General U Thant reports that unpaid U.N. bills will amount to \$172.7 million by the end of 1963.

Dec. 17—Addressing the General Assembly, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson urges a "peaceful revolution" throughout the world to solve the problems of hunger, disease and poverty.

The 18th session of the General Assembly ends.

Dec. 18—South Africa withdraws from the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization because of a Dec. 5 F.A.O. resolution barring the country from participation in any F.A.O. regional meetings in Africa.

Dec. 27—The Security Council meets in emergency session to discuss the situation on Cyprus. No action is taken at the session.

World Peace Council

Dec. 1—Clashes develop between supporters of the Soviet and the Chinese positions at the World Peace Council. Albania joins China in calling the Soviet support of the partial ban on nuclear testing a "fraud."

Dec. 3—The World Peace Council ends after a sharp rejection of Peking's call for a militant anti-Western policy.

ALBANIA

Dec. 11—The Tirana radio announces terms of a new trade agreement between Albania and Communist China. In return for wheat, agricultural machinery, cotton and steel tubing, Albania is to supply Peking with chrome, crude oil, iron-nickel ore and tobacco.

Dec. 31—Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu greets Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, terming his visit "the best New Year's gift for the Albanian people."

ALGERIA

Dec. 21—Chinese Premier Chou En-lai arrives in Algiers for a 6-day visit.

Dec. 26—Premier Chou asserts that both Algeria and the United Arab Republic support his proposal for a second "Bandung Conference" of Asian and African nations.

Dec. 29—The Soviet Union promises to help Algeria realize its plans for an independent national economy.

ARGENTINA

Dec. 12—Argentina requests the extradition of Juan D. Peron from Spain to stand trial on a charge of statutory rape.

BOLIVIA

Dec. 6—Three U.S. officials and a Peace Corps worker among others are seized by tin miners. They are held as hostages for labor leaders recently arrested by the government.

Dec. 16—After the tin miners approve an agreement providing for the release of hostages in exchange for the withdrawal of the troops surrounding the tin mining area, and the government pledges to move the trial of two detained mine-union leaders from the La Paz court, 17 hostages, including the Americans, are freed.

BRAZIL

Dec. 23—The government decrees a state monopoly on all petroleum imports in a move to help the balance of payments problem by diversifying the sources of crude oil imports.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

Australia

Dec. 17—Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies announces a major reshuffle of his Cabinet. Seven younger men are brought into the Cabinet, increasing the size from 22 to 25.

Ghana

Dec. 9—Two former government ministers and a former executive secretary of the ruling Convention People's party are acquitted of charges of treason by a special court.

Dec. 11—President Kwame Nkrumah revokes the appointment of Sir Arku Korsah as Chief Justice. Justice Korsah was presi-

dent of the special court which acquitted three suspects of treason charges.

Dec. 24—Nkrumah announces he has declared "null and void" the recent special court judgment in a treason trial.

Dec. 31—Nkrumah announces a national referendum for constitutional amendments to make his Convention People's party the only national party of Ghana.

Great Britain

Dec. 9—The Foreign Office says it "strongly resents" Arab pressures on British companies to induce them to discriminate against British Jewish staff members. It also "strongly disapproves" action by Arab embassies in London to bring pressure on British companies not to trade with Israel.

Dec. 20—A spokesman for the Board of Trade says Britain cannot be a party to any inter-governmental regulation of the trade in wool textiles. He says the government opposes proposed quota restrictions of textiles into the United States.

India

Dec. 1—The state of Nagaland comes into existence as India's smallest state, with a population of 400,000, to meet the self-government demands of the Naga tribe.

Dec. 9—Citizens of the former Portuguese territory of Goa voted for the first time. The Congress party wins only one out of 30 seats to the new Legislative Assembly; the Maharashtra Gomantak party, favoring merger of Goa with the state of Maharashtra, wins 14 seats.

Kenya

Dec. 6—Police report that raiders attacking from Ethiopia have killed 22 tribesmen in the Northern Frontier district.

Dec. 12—Kenya achieves its independence.

Dec. 24—A state of emergency is declared in the northeast near the Somali border.

Dec. 26—Kenya and Ethiopia sign a mutual-defense agreement.

Dec. 28—A military delegation from Ethiopia arrives in Nairobi to discuss the alleged Somali threat to both countries.

Dec. 29—Kenya seals off her frontier with Somalia.

Malaysia, Federation of

(See also *Int'l, Nato and Indonesia*)

Dec. 11—The House of Representatives meets for the first time. Prime Minister Prince Abdul Rahman tells the body that Indonesia's policy of "containment" has gone beyond the stage of economic boycott.

Dec. 13—The government says that Indonesia's economic war has cost Malaysia 3 per cent of its total world trade since September.

Dec. 28—Parliament approves a \$53 million arms program for 1964.

Pakistan

Dec. 20—The chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, ends a two-day visit to Karachi with assurances that "nothing the U.S. will ever do will be contrary" to Pakistan's security.

Dec. 25—Ending its semi-annual session, the National Assembly approves the government's Fundamental Rights Bill, empowering the courts to enforce civil rights.

Uganda

Dec. 23—Six Britons are deported in retaliation for a recent party satirizing the new independence of Uganda.

Dec. 24—Eight white civil servants are expelled from Uganda for having attended a controversial party considered insulting to Africans.

Zanzibar

Dec. 10—After 73 years as a British protectorate, Zanzibar becomes independent, and elects to remain within the British Commonwealth.

BRITISH EMPIRE

British Guiana

Dec. 12—Deputy Premier Brindley Benn reveals the country has imported goods from Cuba during the past 8 months to the value of \$700,000.

Dec. 24—Premier Cheddi Jagan announces that British Guiana will leave the Caribbean Organization Dec. 31, 1964.

South Arabian Federation

Dec. 10—A state of emergency is declared in Aden after a hand grenade explodes at

the airport, killing one and injuring 39. The frontier with Yemen is closed and Yemeni aircraft are banned.

Dec. 12—A spokesman for the South Arabian Federal Government says 3 persons are being held in connection with the terrorist attack and that 234 Yemeni have been deported.

BULGARIA

Dec. 21—Ivan-Asen Khristov Georgiev, a former top Bulgarian official at the U.N., is accused of spying for the U.S. over the past 5 years.

Dec. 26—Georgiev pleads guilty of spying for the U.S. and asks the Supreme Court for the full penalty.

Dec. 27—A Sofia mob of more than 2,000 besieges the U.S. legation.

Dec. 28—Foreign Minister Ivan Bashev apologizes for the stoning of the U.S. legation.

Dec. 31—Georgiev receives the death sentence.

CAMBODIA

Dec. 12—Cambodia orders its ambassador to the U.S. and the entire staff of its Washington embassy to return home.

Dec. 13—Philip Sprouse, U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia, is called home for consultation.

Dec. 14—Cambodia announces the closing of its London Embassy and the recalling of the diplomatic staff there.

Dec. 17—The Soviet Union informs Britain that it favors an early international conference on Cambodian neutrality.

Dec. 20—President Diosdado Macapagal of the Philippines offers to mediate the differences between the U.S. and Cambodia.

Dec. 21—Prince Norodom Sihanouk assures the U.S. that an international conference on Cambodian neutrality will not be used as a forum to criticize U.S. policies in Southeast Asia.

Dec. 26—Cambodia agrees to Macapagal's mediation suggestion if the U.S. first meets two conditions. These are that the U.S. offer an apology for its protest of a Cambodian broadcast allegedly expressing pleas-

ure at the assassination of President Kennedy and that it officially withdraw its demand for an investigation.

Dec. 27—The U.S. State Department announces its acceptance of the Philippine offer of good offices in the Cambodian dispute.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

Dec. 3—At the closing session of the National People's Congress, officials state that important economic progress is being made through China's own efforts and despite the "perfidious" action of the Soviet Union in cutting off aid. It is also announced that next year the number of deputies elected to the Congress, now 1,012, will be more than doubled.

Dec. 10—The official news agency dismisses as hypocrisy Premier Khrushchev's November 24 suggestion for an end to polemics in the ideological dispute between China and the U.S.S.R.

Dec. 13—Premier Chou En-lai leaves for a trip to the United Arab Republic, Algeria and Morocco.

Dec. 16—In Cairo, Chou asserts that his government wishes to help the African nations develop their economies and will give aid without political strings.

CONGO REPUBLIC (Brazzaville)

Dec. 11—In national general elections, the provisional government party is returned to power. Premier Alphonse Massamba-Debat becomes the new President.

Dec. 25—President Massamba-Debat names Dr. Pascal Lissouba as Premier.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

Dec. 1—Foreign Minister Auguste Mabika-Kalanda is dismissed and arrested after providing Katanga's exiled former President Tshombe with a Congolese passport.

Dec. 5—Mabika-Kalanda is released from prison, but Premier Cyrille Adoula continues to hold the Foreign Affairs portfolio.

Dec. 13—The territorial administrator for

the Kipushi area of Katanga is arrested on charges of maintaining an arms cache for Katanganese rebels.

CYPRUS

(See also *Int'l, U.N.*)

Dec. 21—Two Turkish Cypriotes are killed in Nicosia as tension between the Greek and Turkish communities erupts over proposed constitutional amendments.

Dec. 23—Meeting her treaty obligation, Britain formally asks the Greek and Turkish governments to join her in urging President Makarios to use all available legal means to end the violence.

Dec. 25—Turkish and Greek troops stationed on Cyprus enter the fighting on the sides of their respective Cypriote countrymen.

Dec. 26—A joint force of British, Greek and Turkish troops is established and a cease-fire gradually takes effect.

Dec. 29—Duncan Sandys, British Commonwealth and Colonial Secretary, proposes a neutral zone between the warring communities in Nicosia, with British troops given freedom of movement to restore order.

Dec. 30—Fighting ends as President Makarios, leader of the Greek Cypriotes, and Vice President Kutchuk, leader of the Turkish Cypriotes, agree to the British proposal.

Vice President Kutchuk says the Constitution no longer exists because there is "no possibility" of the Turkish and Greek communities living together.

Dec. 31—Fighting resumes as the Turkish Cypriote spokesman demands partition of the island. Makarios, rejecting the demand, says he will call for U.N. help if the British peace plan fails to reunify the country.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Dec. 22—Dr. Emilio de los Santos, a moderate conservative, resigns as president of the ruling junta. Foreign Minister Dr. Reid Cabral is named to take his place.

ETHIOPIA

(See *British Commonwealth, Kenya*)

FRANCE

Dec. 12—Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville tells the National Assembly that the government is interested in developing trade and cultural relations with Communist China.

Dec. 15—President Charles de Gaulle pardons 100 persons accused of trying to subvert his efforts to end the Algerian war.

Dec. 16—De Gaulle assures U.S. Secretary of State Rusk that France does not intend to recognize Communist China in the near future.

Dec. 30—The State Security Court sentences former Colonel Antoine Argoud to life imprisonment for his part in the 1961 military revolt.

In an interview broadcast over the government television service, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai says that he believes in peaceful coexistence and does not think that war with the West is inevitable.

Dec. 31—In a year-end speech to the nation President de Gaulle says France will continue to develop its own hydrogen bomb.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Dec. 8—Protesting the government's refusal to consider until next year any further increase in compensation for former prisoners of war, more than 10,000 former prisoners march through Bonn.

Dec. 19—The Defense Ministry announces that West Germany's armed forces now total 404,000.

Dec. 20—Twenty-two former staff members of the Auschwitz concentration camp go on trial in Frankfurt.

Dec. 27—Chancellor Ludwig Erhard flies to Texas for a two-day meeting with President Johnson.

GERMANY, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (East)

(See also *Int'l, Berlin*)

Dec. 6—The East German Government informs Mayor Willy Brandt that West Berliners may be permitted to visit friends and relatives in East Berlin during the Christ-

mas holiday. An East-West commission begins talks on the technical details of issuing the day-passes.

Dec. 8—First Secretary Walter Ulbricht says he is prepared to go to West Germany for talks with Chancellor Erhard to discuss relations between East and West Germany.

Dec. 17—Agreement on issuance of passes is reached by representatives of the West Berlin government and East Germany.

Dec. 25—East German guards fatally shoot an 18-year-old East Berliner attempting to escape into West Berlin.

Dec. 31—It is reported that more than 500,000 West Germans have crossed the Berlin wall with passes in the last 15 days.

GREECE

Dec. 16—The newly elected Parliament holds its first session.

Dec. 24—Dissatisfied with a confidence vote of 167 to 130, Premier George Papandreu resigns. He tells King Paul he refuses to stake the life of his new Cabinet on the support of the 28 pro-Communist deputies which had enabled him to win his vote of confidence.

Dec. 27—Panayotis Canelopoulos of the rightest National Radical Union tells King Paul he is unable to form a government and insists that the only solution for the present deadlock is new elections.

HUNGARY

Dec. 23—Following acceptance of the 1964 economic plan by the Council of Ministers, the government announces the successful completion of the 1963 plan and says a 6 per cent national income increase is expected next year.

Dec. 24—Premier Janos Kadar calls for peace, or at least silence, in the Peking-Moscow ideological quarrel.

INDONESIA

(See also *British Commonwealth, Federation of Malaysia*)

Dec. 19—President Sukarno accuses the U.S. of trying to deter Indonesia from her objective of opposition to Malaysia by sending the Seventh Fleet into the Indian Ocean.

Dec. 27—An extraordinary military tribunal is established to handle "special cases" involving the safety of the state.

ITALY

Dec. 5—President Antonio Segni swears in the new government headed by Aldo Moro, political secretary of the Christian Democratic party. For the first time in 16 years, the center-left, four-party coalition includes the Socialists and their leader, Pietro Nenni, who is Deputy Premier.

Dec. 17—The Chamber of Deputies gives a 350-to-233 vote of confidence to the new government.

KOREA, SOUTH

Dec. 16—After two and half years of rule, the military junta dissolves itself.

Dec. 17—The newly elected National Assembly declares the establishment of the third republic. General Chung Hee Park, former head of the junta, becomes President.

MEXICO

Dec. 12—The government announces that about 80 per cent of the business concerns will be required to share profits with their workers, beginning in April.

PERU

Dec. 31—After a censure motion is approved by the Chamber of Deputies, the government of Premier Oscar Trelles resigns. The censure centers around social disturbances in the Cuzco region.

POLAND

Dec. 1—The Communist party newspaper *Trybuna Ludu* announces that the government has approved measures to concentrate on consumer goods at the expense of heavy industry.

Dec. 28—At Plock, Polish and other Eastern European leaders celebrate the formal opening of the last link in the pipeline to carry crude oil from the heart of the Soviet Union to East Europe.

RUMANIA

Dec. 1—President Gheorghiu-Dej returns to Bucharest after a 9-day official visit to Yugoslavia. The two countries sign an

agreement to build jointly one of Europe's largest hydroelectric facilities and agree to expand their trade relations.

SENEGAL

Dec. 1—At least 12 persons are killed in anti-government demonstrations during national elections. President Leopold Senghor, with no opponent running against him, is re-elected.

SPAIN

Dec. 12—A plebiscite is held in Spanish Guinea on Madrid's proposal for administrative autonomy. By a narrow margin, the plan is approved.

SYRIA

Dec. 1—Ex-President Dr. Nazem el-Kodsi is released from jail.

Dec. 12—The Ministry of Economy announces Syria has banned dealings with 50 British firms because they have had trade relations with Israel.

THAILAND

Dec. 8—Premier Sarit Thanarat dies.

Dec. 9—Thanom Kittikachorn, former Deputy Premier, is named premier by King Phumiphal Adulbet.

TUNISIA

Dec. 13—Launching a three-day celebration of France's October 15 evacuation of the Bizerte base, President Habib Bourguiba entertains U.A.R. President Gamal Addel Nasser and Algeria's Premier Ahmed Ben Bella. The three stress Arab unity on the "Palestine problem."

Dec. 27—The government announces it intends to recognize the Chinese Communist government and that Premier Chou En-lai has been invited to visit Tunisia next month.

TURKEY

Dec. 2—Premier Ismet Inonu's three-party coalition government collapses after key members withdraw from the cabinet.

Dec. 10—Ragip Gumerpala, leader of the Opposition Justice party, agrees to try to form a new government.

Dec. 25—Inonu accepts an invitation to form a new government after the Justice party fails to do so.

U.S.S.R., THE

Dec. 4—Figures made available by the Communist party's secretary in the major wheat producing area of the Virgin Lands territory reveal the extent of the crop failure. The report says that not only did the area provide no surplus for the nation's markets; it did not even meet normal local requirements.

Dec. 9—Premier Nikita Khrushchev announces a 7-year program of expansion of the chemical industry to double farm production by 1970. The Premier's speech opens the week-long meeting of the Communist party's Central Committee.

Dec. 13—It is revealed at the close of the Central Committee's meeting that Fred R. Kozlov, who has been paralyzed by a stroke, will be retained on the Presidium and the Secretariat.

Dec. 16—Finance Minister Garbuzov presents the new budget to the opening session of the Supreme Soviet. It calls for a reduction of 600 million rubles (\$660 million) in the defense budget. A projected increase in the minimum wage is delayed until 1965.

Dec. 18—More than 500 African students demonstrate before the Kremlin in protest against the death of a Ghanaian student in the Soviet Union, and charge racial discrimination.

Dec. 19—Closing its annual session, the Supreme Soviet retains Leonid Brezhnev as President of the Soviet Union. The government's economic plan and its budget for the next two years are also approved.

Dec. 24—Ivan Fadeyev, Finance Minister of the Russian Republic, says that 14 per cent of all state enterprises in the largest republic failed to fulfill their quotas in 1963.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, THE

Dec. 14—Chinese Premier Chou En-lai arrives in Cairo to begin discussions of "Asian-African solidarity."

Dec. 23—President Nasser calls for a meeting of all heads of Arab states on the question of Israel's projected diversion of water from the Jordon River.

UNITED STATES, THE(See also *Bolivia; Int'l, Berlin*)**Civil Rights**

Dec. 19—Five Alabama National Guardsmen are charged with having set off explosions last month near the University of Alabama while part of a federalized unit was on duty to protect a Negro student.

Economy, The

Dec. 9—The Studebaker Corporation announces it is abandoning automobile production in the U.S. Operations are to be shifted to Canada "on a more restricted basis."

Dec. 27—The Labor Department says that in 1963 prices rose 1.6 per cent, the sharpest increase since 1958.

Foreign Policy

Dec. 4—President Lyndon Johnson orders sharp tariff increases on brandy, trucks, dextrine and potato starch. The action is in retaliation for the European Common Market's levies on U.S. poultry shipments.

Dec. 13—Asking Americans to take a "realistic" view of the China problem, official State Department spokesmen say the U.S. is keeping the "door open" for negotiations with Communist China when its leaders abandon their "hatred" of the U.S.

Dec. 14—Thomas C. Mann, Ambassador to Mexico, is named Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

The U.S. recognizes the regimes of the Dominican Republic and Honduras after accepting their pledges to hold elections in 1965.

Dec. 20—The State Department informally warns Spain that its rapidly expanding trade with Cuba may force the U.S. to invoke its ban on aid to countries helping the Castro regime.

Dec. 26—Johnson names a special 5-man committee to make a top-level review of the objectives and organization of the foreign aid program.

The Commerce Department approves two licenses for the export of \$40.6 million worth of wheat to the Soviet Union.

Dec. 27—Theodoro Moscoso is relieved as coordinator of the Alliance for Progress. Thomas Mann is assigned responsibility for the program.

Dec. 28—West German Chancellor Erhard confers with Johnson at the President's Texas ranch.

Dec. 29—A joint communiqué ending the Johnson-Erhard talks says both men will "explore all opportunities for the improvement of East-West relations."

Government

Dec. 3—House Speaker John McCormack, next in line for the presidency, is invited to attend all sessions of the National Security Council and other key decision-making meetings.

The White House announces that Johnson is attempting to limit the federal budget for fiscal 1965 to between \$98 and \$103 billion.

Dec. 5—Johnson announces the terms of an agreement he has made with House Speaker McCormack on the workings of a temporary succession in the event of a presidential disability.

The Warren commission investigating the Kennedy assassination holds its first meeting and decides to ask Congress for subpoena powers.

Dec. 9—The Federal Bureau of Investigation sends its report on the Kennedy assassination to the Warren commission. The report says there is no doubt that Lee H. Oswald was the assassin, and affirms there was no link between Oswald and Jack Ruby, the accused murderer of Oswald.

Johnson turns over to the Interior Department the authority to set national oil policies.

Dec. 11—Johnson instructs Cabinet officers to hold down new federal employment and to achieve more substantial economies in administration.

Dec. 12—The Senate gives final congressional approval to a \$102-million authorization for the Peace Corps.

Dec. 13—The Interstate Commerce Commission approves the merger of the Atlantic

Coast Line and the Seaboard Air Line railroads.

Dec. 16—Johnson signs the \$1.2 billion college-aid bill and hails it as the most significant education bill in history.

Dec. 17—The Senate ratifies a treaty ceding a 43-acre area in El Paso to Mexico.

Public hearings of the Senate Rules Committee begin in the investigation of the financial activities of Robert Baker, former secretary to the Senate Democratic Majority.

Johnson signs a measure providing \$95 million over the next three years to help state and local agencies combat air pollution.

A U.S. Court of Appeals reverses the conviction of the Communist party for failing to register under the Internal Security Act.

Dec. 18—Johnson signs a \$1.6 billion measure to assist vocational schools, provide loans for college students and assist public schools near federal installations.

Dec. 20—An 11-member bipartisan presidential Commission on Registration and Voting Participation urges sweeping election reforms, including abolition of literacy tests, poll taxes and residence requirements.

The Civil Aeronautics Board approves a reduction in long-distance domestic air fares.

Dec. 21—Johnson orders the formation of a high-level government committee to help him handle the impact of possible arms reductions and shifts in defense spending.

Dec. 22—The 30-day period of national mourning for John F. Kennedy ends.

Dec. 30—The first session of the 88th Congress adjourns after the Senate gives final approval to the \$3 billion compromise foreign aid appropriation.

Dec. 31—Johnson signs a \$4.4 billion public works bill with a protest that one section is unconstitutional.

Labor

Dec. 6—Four railroad unions file suit against the federal arbitration ruling that nearly 200 railroads can eliminate 90 per cent of

the firemen's jobs in freight and yard service.

Dec. 17—The Labor Department issues final rules outlawing racial discrimination in apprenticeship training programs.

Military

Dec. 7—The Defense Department announces plans to reduce its civilian payroll by 25,000, bringing the total down to 997,000 by July, 1964.

Dec. 10—Defense Secretary Robert McNamara reveals plans for a military space laboratory to be launched into orbit in late 1967 or early 1968. He also announces that the Dyna-Soar space glider project has been canceled.

Dec. 12—McNamara announces plans to close or reduce operations at 33 military installations, 26 in the U.S. and 7 overseas.

Dec. 13—The National Aeronautics and Space Administration curtails its program for unmanned exploration of the moon by canceling flight plans for five Ranger space-craft.

Dec. 15—It is revealed that the Defense Department has decided to develop a military communications satellite system.

Dec. 21—The Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy criticizes as "illogical and wasteful" the recent decision against building a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.

Dec. 30—After conferring with the President, McNamara indicates that next year's defense budget will be about \$51 billion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have asked for \$60 billion.

Politics

Dec. 7—It is reported that former President Eisenhower has urged Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge to make himself available for the Republican presidential nomination.

Results in the gubernatorial primary in Louisiana indicate that loyal Democrats have regained power in that state and that forces sympathetic to Republican Senator Barry Goldwater have lost strength.

Dec. 8—Ambassador Lodge says in Saigon that although he has no plans to run for the presidency, he will give serious consideration to any Eisenhower suggestion.

Dec. 21—U.S. Congressman William Green of Pennsylvania, head of the Philadelphia Democratic organization, dies.

Dec. 22—Pennsylvania's Governor William Scranton says he will give "deep thought" to the possibility of becoming a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination.

Adlai E. Stevenson says he would be willing to accept the nomination for Vice President on a ticket headed by President Johnson.

Dec. 26—Harold Stassen says he will seek the Republican presidential nomination.

Dec. 29—New York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller announces he will enter Oregon's presidential primary election.

Supreme Court

Dec. 9—The Supreme Court upholds a decision of the Interstate Commerce Commission approving the application of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway to take control of the Baltimore and Ohio.

Dec. 16—By a unanimous decision, because of insufficient evidence, the Supreme Court sets aside the contempt conviction of two Southern segregationists accused of violating an injunction against a meeting of the National States Rights Party in Alabama. The American Civil Liberties Union and the N.A.A.C.P. sided with the segregationists, protesting a violation of due process.

VATICAN, THE

Dec. 4—The Ecumenical Council ends its second session after approving a constitution reforming the sacred liturgy and adopting a decree on communications media.

Pope Paul VI announces that he will visit the Holy Land in January.

Dec. 6—The Patriarch of the Eastern Orthodox Church, Athenagoras I, proposes that a meeting of the heads of the major branches of Christianity be held in Jerusalem during Pope Paul's visit.

VENEZUELA

Dec. 1—Despite terrorist activities to discourage voting, 96 per cent of the electorate turn out for the presidential and congressional elections. The Democratic Action party polls 32 per cent of the votes cast and its candidate, Dr. Raul Leoni, wins the presidency.

VIETNAM, (South)

Dec. 9—The Military Revolutionary Council says it is barring the return of neutralist and pro-Communist political exiles. It also rejects any possibility of neutralizing South Vietnam while North Vietnam is Communist-dominated. The Council also opposes calling an international conference to guarantee the neutrality of Cambodia.

Dec. 11—The Provisional Government suspends publication of three Saigon newspapers.

Dec. 15—South Vietnam sends a goodwill mission to Cambodia in an effort to restore diplomatic relations, broken off in August by Cambodia.

Dec. 19—U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara arrives in Saigon for a two-day study of the military situation.

Dec. 20—McNamara tells the Provisional government that the U.S. will back the war against the guerrillas as long as its help is needed.

Dec. 25—The government orders the seizure of millions of dollars worth of property of the family of the late President Diem and collaborators in his regime.

YUGOSLAVIA

Dec. 16—A government official says the country's economic plan for 1964 will aim at a 10 per cent expansion in the national growth rate, compared to a 12 per cent expansion this year. The present year is described as a good year in almost every major branch of the economy.

Dec. 27—Parliament approves a record federal budget of 721.7 billion dinars (\$2.4 billion), with half the sum marked for defense.

ES BELOW ARE AVAILABLE FOR QUANTITY PURCHASE
ATE IN PROPER SPACE THE NUMBER OF EACH ISSUE WANTED

SUES

a (1/63)
ca (2/63)
)
any (4/63)
(5/63)
t and Medicine in the U.S. (8/63)
3)
n (10/63)
ommon Market (11/63)
rica (12/63)
ca (1/64)
(2/64)

ON

(3/64)

4)
the Western Alliance (5/64)

able

ew Nationalism (10/61)

- Africa South of Sahara (12/62)
- American Economy (7/60)
- American Foreign Policy and the Communist World (10/59)
- Asia and Southeast Asia (12/61)
- Asia, South and Southeast (11/62)
- China (9/62)
- Disarmament and Coexistence (5/62)
- Government and Education Abroad (6/61)
- Government and Education in the U.S. (7/61)
- Government and Labor in the U.S. (9/59)
- Middle East in Perspective (4/62)
- Problems of American Education (8/61)
- Progress in the Middle East (5/60)
- Public Power in the U.S. (5/58)
- Russia (10/62)
- Soviet Union: Programs and Policies (11/61)
- Tensions in East Central Europe (4/59)
- U.S. Military Policy and World Security (4/60)
- World Federalism and Free World Security (8/60)

INDIVIDUAL SUBSCRIPTION RATES: 1 year, \$7.75; 2 years, \$14.50; 9 months, \$6.05.

GROUP SUBSCRIPTION RATES: 1 subscription, \$6.05; 5 or more, \$5.15 per sub.; 10 or more per sub.; 30 or more, \$4.25 per sub.; 50 or more, \$3.80 per sub.

MONTHLY GROUP SUBSCRIPTION RATES: 1 subscription, \$7.75; 5 or more, \$6.85 per sub.; 10 or more per sub.; 30 or more, \$5.75 per sub.; 50 or more, \$4.95 per sub.

QUANTITY PURCHASE: 1 copy of a single issue, 85¢ per copy; 5 or more copies of different issues, 65¢ per copy; 5 or more of the same issue, 55¢ per copy; 10 or more of the same issue, 50¢ or more of the same issue, 45¢ per copy; 100 or more of the same issue, 35¢ per copy.

HISTORY

1822 Ludlow Street

Philadelphia 3, Pa.

Send me the issues I have indicated above in the quantities I have marked.

Send me group subscriptions for 9 months; or 12 months.

\$7.75 plus 3 free issues as marked above. 2 years, \$14.50 plus 3 free issues as marked above.

Check enclosed. Bill me.

..... ZONE STATE 2-64-3

are good only on orders mailed directly to the publisher.

KEEP UP-TO-DATE

SOME OF THE THINGS **CURRENT History** OFFERS YOU

★**AREA STUDIES** . . . Month after Month, our area studies will keep you informed and round out your background information on vital topics.

CHINA (Sept., '63)
RUSSIA (Oct., '63)
COMMON MARKET (Nov., '63)
WEST AFRICA (Dec., '63)
LATIN AMERICA (Jan., '64)

SOUTH ASIA (Feb., '64)
EAST AFRICA (Mar., '64)
JAPAN (Apr., '64)
BRITAIN AND THE WESTERN
ALLIANCE (May, '64)

Subscribe now to **CURRENT HISTORY**. Exclusive and Original Studies will provide you with invaluable, factual material that you can rely on for accuracy.

Nowhere is such material duplicated. Nowhere are similar studies available at such low cost. **CURRENT HISTORY**'s continuing re-volumes are one-of-a-kind.

COORDINATED AREA STUDIES contain seven or eight articles each devoted to a pertinent topic in world affairs. Each of our contributors is a specialist in his field, who brings you his first-hand knowledge and impressions. Each article in an issue focuses on a different aspect of the subject for complete coverage of the complex problems of the world.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW . . . offers a day-by-day chronological account of the important events in all the countries of the world, both large and small. This is the only monthly chronology of its kind being published in the United States.

AREA MAPS help you follow the text.

CH 6-64 RLR 9-3-63
INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS
CENTER IMPERIAL SCHLS
363 GROVE ST
PASADENA CALIF

DOCUMENTS . . . Our documents section reprints the texts of important treaties, laws, diplomatic notes, speeches, to provide original source material. See how this material increases your understanding of how history is made.

BOOKS REVIEWS . . . Comments on current books of interest to our readers bring you concise notes evaluating the latest publications in the social science field.

A SPECIAL INTRODUCTORY BONUS

With your subscription you will receive three free issues. Today your need for background information on the problems of our century has increased one-hundredfold. Concerned citizens everywhere are awakening to the fact that they must be prepared to meet ever-growing demands upon their insight and understanding.

3 FREE ISSUES

Your subscription to **CURRENT HISTORY** will include three coordinated studies FREE — chosen from our list of Available Issues (see reverse side) — plus the next 12 issues for the usual yearly subscription price. Don't forget to select your three free gift copies from our list on the other side of this cover.

← PLEASE SEE OTHER SIDE FOR FULL DETAILS